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ABSTRACT
Faking on self-report personality tests is a widespread practice which degrades the
construct validity of personality tests when they are used in personnel selection contexts and may
lead to suboptimal hiring decisions (Donovan, Dwight, & Hurtz, 2003; Schmit & Ryan, 1993).
While much is known about the factors which enable job applicants to successfully engage in
faking (Tett, Freund, Christiansen, Fox, & Coaster, 2012), far less is known about how specific
applicant perceptions throughout the hiring process influence their decision to engage in this
practice. To this end, this study applied Vroom’s (1964) expectancy theory to the study of
applicant faking. Following the work of prior researchers (Peterson, Griffith, & Converse, 2009),
this study incorporated an experimental paradigm in which participants were led to believe that
they were completing a personality test as part of the hiring process.
Results of the study suggested that applicant faking on personality tests within personnel
selection contexts is largely driven by valence (the extent to which applicants perceive the job to
which they are applying as desirable) and expectancy judgments (an applicant’s self-efficacy
regarding their ability to successfully engage in faking). However, the three-way interaction
between valence, instrumentality, and expectancy judgments which forms the crux of Vroom’s
(1964) theory did not demonstrate a significant impact on subsequent faking. A positive
relationship between cognitive ability and faking was also found, suggesting that highly
intelligent job applicants are more prone to engage in this behavior. In addition, applicant
integrity demonstrated no relationship to faking behavior, suggesting that job applicants may not
view the practice as being unethical. The potential implications of these findings in real-world
selection contexts was discussed.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
The use of personality inventories for selection purposes is a nearly ubiquitous practice in
modern human resource management (Oswald & Hough, 2011), and for good reason. Wellconstructed personality inventories have been shown to be valid predictors of a wide variety of
criteria including task performance, (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Ones, Viswesvaran, & Schmidt,
1993) leadership (Chan & Drasgow, 2001; Judge, Bono, Ilies, & Gerhardt, 2002), occupational
attainment (Roberts, Kuncel, Shiner, Caspi, & Goldberg, 2007), in addition to contextual aspects
of performance such as voice (Maynes & Podsakoff, 2013), organizational citizenship behavior
(Borman, Penner, Allen, & Motowidlo, 2001), and deviance (Berry, Ones, & Sackett, 2007).
Such inventories have also been shown to provide incremental validity beyond general mental
ability for predicting task (Day & Silverman, 1989), contextual (Avis, Kudisch, & Fortunato,
2002) and adaptive performance (Colodro-Plaza, Garcés de los Fayos, López-Garcia, &
Colondro-Conde, 2015). Not only are such inventories relatively inexpensive when compared
with alternative tools such as assessment centers (König, Klehe, Berchtold, & Kleinmann, 2010),
but they are also less likely to result in adverse impact relative to selectors such as cognitive
ability (Ployhart & Holtz, 2008).
In spite of the objections of those who contend that such assessments are likely to be of
little use in most applied settings (Davis-Blake & Pfeffer, 1989; Morgeson, Campion, Dipboye,
Hollenbeck, Murphy, & Schmitt, 2007), it seems as if their use is unlikely to wane in the near
future. However, the use of such assessments is predicated on the notion that individual
applicants are responding to items truthfully when completing these inventories. Frankly, this
notion is untenable due to the fact that for applicants, the selection context is an inherently highstakes situation in which applicants seldom anticipate being held accountable for dishonest
1

responses. This is especially true when these inventories are administered online, as is now
customary (Grieve & Elliott, 2013).
Faking on personality assessments, defined for the purposes of this study as the deliberate
distortion of one’s responses in order to present an inaccurate and socially desirable image of
oneself, has been the focus of a tremendous volume of research literature within the
organizational sciences, and for good reason. There has been a great deal of research into the
individual differences, such as cognitive ability (Pauls & Crost, 2005) and job knowledge
(Raymark & Tafero, 2009), which enable an applicant to engage in successful distortion.
However, relatively little is known about the factors which may influence an applicant’s decision
to engage in faking.
Given the widespread prevalence of applicant faking on personality inventories within
selection settings (Donovan, Dwight, & Hurtz, 2003; Donovan, Dwight, & Schneider, 2014), it
seems as a large portion of the applicant population is motivated to engage in faking. However,
little is known about how specific applicant perceptions of the hiring situation impact their
motivation to engage in this behavior. While there has been some prior work in this area
(McFarland & Ryan, 2006), this research has yet to examine the cumulative impact of multiple
distinct applicant attitudes on faking behavior within an experimental setting. As such, this study
seeks to begin filling this gap in the existing literature by applying Vroom’s (1964) expectancy
theory, a popular theoretical framework in the study of motivation, to the domain of applicant
faking. Vroom's (1964) expectancy theory posits that the extent to which one is motivated to
engage in a particular course of action is dictated by the multiplicative product of three distinct
situational judgments pertaining to outcome desirability, task-specific self-efficacy, and the
perceived correspondence between successful task performance and a desired outcome. In doing
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so, this study aims to answer recent calls (Ellingson & McFarland, 2011) for the incorporation of
this framework into the study of response distortion and other forms of deviant behavior and to
further our understanding of the cognitive processes underlying responses to personality
inventories within selection settings. It is my hope that this study will yield information that is
useful to practitioners who are implementing real-world selection batteries and wish to craft an
applicant experience which discourages them from engaging in willful deception.
In addition to examining the direct impact of the situational perceptions described in
Vroom’s (1964) expectancy theory on applicant faking behavior, this study is also going to
examine the potential for traits such as cognitive ability and integrity to moderate these
relationships. Prior research has suggested that deviant behavior may be influenced by
interactions between perceptions of one’s environment and stable individual differences (Burton,
Mitchell, & Lee, 2005; Sulea, Fine, Fischmann, Sava, & Dumitru, 2013)1. As such, this research
also hopes to further our understanding of the impacts that the interplay between situational and
individual difference variables may have on self-serving deviant behavior.

1

For example, Sulea et al (2013) found that the effect of abusive supervision was associated with subsequent
retaliatory behavior was stronger for employees lower in emotional stability.
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES
Unfortunately, the practice of faking on self-report personality inventories appears to be
commonplace (Donovan et al., 2003), with individuals demonstrating elevated scores on socially
desirable traits such as conscientiousness and emotional stability when completing personality
assessments for selection purposes in real-world settings relative to when they complete such
inventories for research purposes (Arthur, Glaze, Villado, & Taylor, 2010; Birkeland, Manson,
Kisamore, Brannick, & Smith, 2006; Ellingson, Sackett, & Hough, 1999). As a whole, applicants
appear to be fairly adept at accurately inferring which specific traits are considered desirable
within a given occupational context and distorting their responses accordingly, going so far as to
produce false personality profiles2 with a remarkable degree of consistency across participants in
experimental settings (Furnham, 1990; Tett, Freund, Christiansen, Fox, & Coaster, 2012). This is
of great concern for organizations hoping to implement such assessments because it inhibits the
ability to select individuals based on true indications of their typical behavioral tendencies.
Unfortunately, faking likely results in instances in which those willing to engage in such
deception are selected in favor of their similarly-qualified, albeit less deceptive, peers (Ellingson
et al., 1999; Griffith, Chmielowski, & Yoshita, 2007; Peterson, Griffith, & Converse, 2009). This
problem is exacerbated by low selection ratios (Rosse, Stecher, Miller, & Levin, 1998),
suggesting that this is especially problematic in selection contexts where many applicants are
competing for the same job.
In addition to compromising the quality of hiring decisions, deliberate faking on
personality inventories has a deleterious effect on the construct validity of these inventories in

2

For example, participants in the Furnham (1990) study showed elevated scores on introversion and
conscientiousness when told that they are applying for a position as a librarian.
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operational settings. In order for a measure of a particular personality trait to possess construct
validity, it must be relatively free of variance from sources other than the focal trait.
Unfortunately, prior research suggests that response distortion introduces large amounts of nontrait related variance into personality inventories. In a classic study in which Schmit and Ryan
(1993) sought to examine the measurement equivalence of the NEO-FFI (Costa & McCrae,
1989) between applicant and nonapplicant populations, the inventory was administered to a
sample of college students and a sample of job applicants for federal positions based in the
Midwest. Not only did the authors find a lack of measurement equivalence between the two
samples, but it was also revealed that a six-factor solution provided superior model fit relative to
a five factor model in the applicant sample. This sixth factor was described by the authors as
corresponding with response distortion due to strong factor loadings3 for the majority of items
corresponding with socially desirable traits, such as conscientiousness, agreeableness, and
extraversion4. In another study in which military personnel completed a 10-factor personality
inventory under both honest and “fake good” conditions, a principal components analysis
revealed a unidimensional factor structure for response data among participants who were
distorting their responses. This finding led the authors to suggest that responses among these
participants were almost entirely dictated by their efforts at impression management (Ellingson
et al., 1999). While some prior studies have suggested that the factor structure of personality
measurements is unaffected by deliberate response distortion (Ellingson, Smith & Sackett, 2001;
Marhsall, Fruyt, Rolland, & Bagby, 2005), these studies have typically incorporated social

3

In some cases the factor loadings for individual items on the “ideal employee factor” were even larger than those
for the corresponding trait itself, please see Table 1 on pg. 970 of Schmit & Ryan (1993).
4
Subsequent research has suggested that because the “correct” response on openness to experience items is less
apparent to applicants relative to items corresponding to other FFM traits, the influence of the “ideal employee
factor” on these items is mitigated to some degree (see Klehe et al., 2012).
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desirability scales (i.e., scales containing bogus items designed to detect people who are
engaging in impression management), the true utility of which for detecting fakers is
questionable at best (Griffith & Peterson, 2008; Honkaniemi, Tolvanen, & Feldt, 2011).
Some prior research suggests that deliberate response distortion attenuates observed
relationships between scores on self-report personality instruments and scores on other self or
peer-report measures of psychological constructs (Holden, 2007; Holden & Passey, 2010) and
supervisory ratings of contextual performance (O’Connell, Kung, & Tristan, 2011; Peterson,
Griffith, Isaacson, O’Connell, & Mangos, 2011). However, response distortion does not appear
to substantively attenuate observed relationships between scores on these inventories and task
performance criteria (Hough, Eaton, Dunnette, Kamp, & McCloy, 1990; O’Connell et al., 2011).
The ability to identify pertinent criteria on selection instruments and to respond accordingly is
facilitated by cognitive ability (Christiansen, Burns, & Montgomery, 2005; Klehe et al., 2012;
Tett et al., 2012), arguably the strongest predictor of task performance (Schmidt & Hunter,
2004). Furthermore, the ability to identify relevant criteria accounts for much of the criterionrelated validity of selection instruments when predicting task performance (Jansen et al., 2013;
Klehe et al., 2012). As such, the robustness of personality measures as predictors of task
performance in spite of response distortion is altogether unsurprising. When taken as a whole,
these findings suggest that qualitatively distinct cognitive processes may underlie honest and
deceptive responses to personality inventories.
The process underlying item response under typical conditions is likely consistent with
Thurstone’s (1928) notion that individuals respond affirmatively to items whose content matches
their level of the latent trait in question (in this case, personality traits). However, responding to
personality inventories during the application process constitutes a somewhat high-stakes
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situation in which many applicants are incentivized to deliberately choose their responses based
on perceived social desirability. This has been demonstrated by prior research incorporating a
wide variety of methodologies (see van Hooft & Born, 2012), most notably in studies which
have compared applicant and nonapplicant responses to a personality inventory using item
response theory in order to examine relationships between latent traits and the probabilities of
specific responses to items. Such studies have revealed differential item functioning5 between
applicant and nonapplicant samples, suggesting that there may be a distinction in the cognitive
processes underlying item response between these two groups (Robie, Schmit, Ryan, & Zickar,
2000; Stark, Chernyshenko, Chan, Lee, & Drasgow, 2001). In addition, this research also
revealed poorer model fit among job applicants, which the authors attributed to the heightened
presence of non-personality-related variance in the response data (Robie et al., 2001). The
generalized graded unfolding model is an item response model that was designed in accordance
with Thurstone’s (1928) ideas about the measurement of attitudes in addition to other non-ability
constructs (Roberts, Donoghue, & Laughlin, 1998). This model is regarded by researchers as
being one of the most appropriate models for measuring non-ability constructs such as
personality (Stark, Chernyshenko, Drasgow, & Williams, 2006; Tay, Drasgow, Rounds, &
Williams, 2009). However, a recent study demonstrated that this model demonstrated weaker
model fit among a sample of participants who were instructed to engage in response distortion
(Cao, Tay, Luo, & Drasgow, 2015). This finding provides further evidence that there may be
differences in the underlying cognitive processes driving responses to personality inventories
under typical and applicant conditions, potentially suggesting that applicants who engage in

5

Differential item functioning occurs when individuals from two different groups demonstrate significant
differences in the relationship between the level of a latent trait (in this case, personality) and the probability of
responding to an item in a specific way.
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faking are responding to personality inventories as they would to an ability-based assessment.
As a field, the organizational sciences has produced a robust library of research
pertaining to additional characteristics, such as verbal ability (Levashina, Morgeson, & Campion,
2012), job knowledge (Raymark & Tafero, 2009) and job experience (Mueller-Hanson,
Heggestad, & Thornton, 2006) that bolster an applicant’s ability to successfully distort their
responses should they choose to do so. However, there has been scant investigation of the
motivational antecedents which may influence an individual’s decision to mobilize the selfregulatory resources necessary for effective response distortion. In addition, the potential
moderating effects that both ability-related and noncognitive traits may have on these
relationships remain unexamined.
Vroom's (1964) expectancy theory is a popular motivational theory which posits that the
extent to which one is motivated to engage in a particular course of action is dictated by the
multiplicative product of three distinct situational judgments pertaining to outcome desirability,
task-specific self-efficacy, and the perceived correspondence between successful task
performance and a desired outcome. As such, this study seeks to empirically examine the ability
of the situational judgments described in Vroom’s (1964) expectancy theory to predict applicant
faking behavior. In addition, this study will also examine the potential roles of both cognitive
ability and trait integrity as moderators of these relationships. By furthering our understanding of
the motivational antecedents of applicant faking on self-report personality inventories, this study
hopes to provide practitioners with information that can be used to discourage applicant faking.
VIE-ing for an Interview
In 1964, Victor Vroom published his seminal book, Work and Motivation, in which he
describes and advances his theory of motivation. According to Vroom’s theory, there are three
8

primary types of judgments which influence the extent to which one is motivated to engage in a
particular course of action: valence judgments, instrumentality judgments, and expectancy
judgments. Valence judgments describe the extent to which a particular distal outcome is
anticipated to result in a favorable affective response relative to all other possible outcomes
(Vroom, 1964, pp. 17). Instrumentality judgments describe the extent to which a proximal
outcome (typically conceptualized as the direct results of successful performance on a certain
task) is seen as associated with the distal outcome of interest (Vroom, 1964, pp. 21). Finally,
expectancy judgments are described as temporary and task-specific beliefs regarding the
probability that a particular action will lead to a specific proximal outcome (Vroom, 1964, pp.
20). Within the context of the current study, valence judgments refer to the extent to which a job
applicant views a job as being desirable, instrumentality judgments refer to the extent to which
job attainment is seen as being contingent upon scores on a personality test, and expectancy
judgments refer to the extent to which an applicant believes they can successfully fake their
answers on a personality assessment.
Vroom theorized that valence, instrumentality, and expectancy influence one another
multiplicatively in order to determine the total amount of motivational force present regarding a
particular course of action, such that:
𝑛

𝐹𝑖 = 𝑓𝑖 [∑(𝐸𝑖𝑗 𝑉𝑗 )](𝑖 = 𝑛 + 1 … 𝑚)
𝑗=1

where Fi = the motivational force to perform act i
Eij = the strength of the expectancy (O ≤ Eij 1) that act i will be followed by outcome j
Vj = the valence of outcome j, whereby
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𝑛

𝑉𝑗 = 𝑓𝑗 [∑(𝑉𝑘 𝐼𝑗𝑘 )](𝑗 = 1 … 𝑛)
𝑘=1

where Ijk = the cognized instrumentality (-1 ≤ Ijk ≤ 1) of outcome j for the attainment of outcome
k.
Ultimately, Vroom contended that motivational force, defined as the cognitive force
acting upon an individual to pursue a particular course of action, is the multiplicative product of
valence, instrumentality, and expectancy judgments. It should also be noted that this process was
theorized to occur for all plausible courses of action within a given situation, such that the course
of action with the greatest motivational force would be perceived by the actor in question as
being the most rational plan. For example, when determining whether or not to engage in
deliberate faking on a personality assessment, an applicant’s motivational force for either course
of action is the product of the valence for multiple distal outcomes (the desirability of the job to
which they are currently applying versus the desirability of other jobs that are potentially
available to them), the level of instrumentality linking the proximal to the distal outcome (the
extent to which job attainment is seen as being dependent on scores on the personality
assessment versus other factors), and their perceived expectancy regarding their ability to attain
the proximal outcome (their confidence that they will successfully be able to make themselves
look like a good candidate via faking and improve their chances of being selected versus the
extent to which they believe that attempts at faking will be unsuccessful). Ultimately, the option
with the highest level of motivational force will be the most subjectively rational course of action
in the eyes of the actor, and they will most likely elect to pursue this course of action.
Vroom (1964) is indeed clear that his theory pertains exclusively to the three way
interaction between valence, instrumentality, and expectancy judgments such that a high level of
any one of these three variables would strengthen the impact of the other two on subsequent
10

behavior. Nonetheless, I contend that due to prior evidence that all three components of Vroom’s
(1964) formula play an important role individually in determining effort and behavior (Bauer,
Orvis, Ely, & Surface, 2015; Van Eerde & Thierry, 1996), an examination of linear effects in
addition to the three-way interaction effect as specified by Vroom for predicting response
distortion is justified.
There has been robust empirical support for Vroom’s (1964) notion that valence
perceptions (i.e., the perceived desirability of an outcome) impact motivation and ultimately,
behavior. For example, in a series of large scale studies conducted among high school students,
valence judgments regarding career outcomes (i.e., the extent to which students perceive having
a prestigious and/or high paying job in the future as being desirable) were associated with
subsequent measures of interest and motivation regarding academic development in addition to
subsequent levels of academic achievement (Porfeli, Ferrari, & Nota, 20136). These measures of
work-related valence have also been found to be predictive of career-exploration behaviors (e.g.,
researching into potential career options or taking necessary steps towards the attainment of a
chosen career) and self-report work motivation (Porfeli, Lee, & Weigold, 2012). Within
occupational settings judgments regarding career outcomes (i.e., the perceived desirability of
being promoted to a new position), have been shown to be positively related to attitudes
regarding training programs and ultimately, the application of what was learned during training
to on-the-job situations (Bauer, Orvis, Ely, & Surface, 2015). Finally, meta-analytic evidence
suggests that outcome valence perceptions are predictive of subsequent task-related effort and
performance (Van Eerde & Thierry, 1996).
Within the context of a selection procedure, valence judgments in all likelihood pertain to

6

Also see Malloch & Michael, 1981 for a similar study conducted among community college students.
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the applicant’s perception that the job for which they are applying will lead to greater personal
satisfaction relative to other jobs that are potentially available to them (Ellingson & McFarland,
2011). It should be noted that valence judgments are inherently subjective (Vroom, 1964, pp.19)
and that certain factors, such as the salary of the position in question, cannot be treated as a
universally influencing the valence judgments among all members of the applicant pool. For
example, a civil engineer with high levels of realistic interests (Holland, 1997) may hold lower
levels of valence towards a project management position to which they are applying relative to
other more conventional engineering jobs to which they may also be applying, even if the project
management position comes with a heftier salary. While the relationship between perceived job
desirability and response distortion has previously been theorized (Ellingson, 2011; McFarland
& Ryan, 2000), this relationship remains unexamined empirically. However, prior research
suggests that valence judgments regarding a specific job are broadly predictive of behaviors that
are aimed at the attainment of a specific job, such as networking or the development of relevant
skills (Bauer et al., 2015; Porfeli et al., 2012; Porfeli et al., 2013). Given that job applicants who
engage in faking on personality inventories that are used within selection contexts are most likely
doing so because they believe that this behavior will increase their chances of attaining the job to
which they are applying, it stands to reason that valence judgments may be associated with
faking on personality inventories. As such,
Hypothesis 1: Valence judgments will be associated with greater subsequent response
distortion.
In addition to the impact of valence judgments, prior research has suggested that
instrumentality judgments influence motivation and behavior. While prior theorists and
researchers have operationalized instrumentality judgments concerning response distortion as the
perception that faking is necessary in order to attain a job (Ellingson, 2011), this is inconsistent
12

with the manner in which Vroom (1964) himself describes instrumentality judgments.
Specifically, Vroom (1964; see pages 17-21) describes instrumentality judgments not as being
evaluations of the potential utility of a specific course of action, but rather as the perceived
relationship between a proximal outcome (in this case, a favorable score on a personality
inventory) and the ultimately desired distal outcome (in this case, receiving a job offer or being
invited to the next stage in the selection process).
Within the organizational sciences, instrumentality judgments have been associated with
training transfer (Bauer et al., 2015; Chiaburu & Lindsay, 2008), task performance, effort
(Pritchard & Sanders, 1973; Van Eerde & Thierry, 1996), and scores on a pre-employment job
knowledge test in a sample of applicants to a police academy (Sanchez, Truxillo, & Bauer,
2000). To date, no prior studies have operationalized instrumentality judgments as self-report
perceptions of the relationship between personality inventory scores and ultimate selection
decisions. However, examining results of previously conducted research among real-world
applicant samples allows one to infer the influence of instrumentality judgments on faking
behavior. For example, the tendency for applicants to exhibit greater distortion on measures of
traits that are clearly job related (for example, conscientiousness and emotional stability) relative
to measures of traits with more ambiguous relationships to job performance (such as openness to
experience; Arthur et al., 2010; Birkeland et al., 2006) suggests that instrumentality judgments
impact response distortion in real-world settings. These findings suggest that the perceived
relationship between a score on a particular trait scale and advancement to the next stage of the
selection battery will likely play a role in influencing the extent to which applicants are
motivated to engage in response distortion. In short, applicants will likely be more motivated to
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engage in faking on self-report personality inventories if they believe that their scores on these
inventories impact their chances of being hired.
Hypothesis 2: Instrumentality judgments will be associated with greater subsequent
response distortion.
Expectancy judgments within the context of response distortion pertain to an applicant’s
belief that they will be able to successfully fake their responses on a particular personality test. In
real-world settings, expectancy judgments are likely high among the majority of job applicants
due to the widespread presence of rumors and folk theories about how to “beat” a specific
personality assessment (Landers, Sackett, & Tuzinski, 2011), and appear to be attenuated by
warnings against faking (Burns, Filipowski, Morris, & Shoda, 2014; Dwight & Donovan, 2003;
Fan, Gao, Carroll, Lopez, Tian, & Meng, 2012)7. Oddly, expectancy judgments regarding faking
appear to be higher among applicant populations when the tests are administered online rather
than on a paper-and-pencil format (Grieve & Elliot, 2013). This is possibly due to the ability of
applicants to research “correct” answers to inventories while completing an online inventory8.
Unlike valence and instrumentality judgments, there already exists several studies in
which the effect of expectancy judgments on subsequent response distortion has been examined.
However, these studies have typically assessed expectancy judgments using a measure of
generalized self-presentation self-efficacy9 (McFarland & Ryan, 2006; Pauls & Crost, 2005)
rather than explicit measures of one’s confidence in their ability to successfully engage in

7

Readers should note that warnings against faking tend to result in the deflation of socially desirable traits, such as
conscientiousness, leading some authors to suggest that the presence of warnings against faking may cause
employees to “fake bad” in order to avoid being labeled as somebody who is distorting their responses.
8
A quick visit to online message boards about the job application process will reveal a multitude of such
discussions.
9
The specific scale used in this study was the Fragebogen zur Wirksamkeit der Selbstdarstellung, with translated
sample items including “In numerous situations I’m able to show myself at my best” and “In courses I’m able to
appear in a way that others perceive me as a capable person”
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response distortion. In addition, these prior studies also incorporated research paradigms in
which participants were explicitly instructed to engage in faking on a personality test. As such,
this relationship remains unexamined in a manner that is consistent with Vroom’s (1964) writing.
Given the fairly robust relationships between self-efficacy, motivation, and performance
(Bandura, 1997), it’s logical to expect that this relationship will be present in the domain of
response distortion as well. As such,
Hypothesis 3: Expectancy Judgments (operationalized as one’s self efficacy regarding
their ability to successfully distort their responses on a personality measure) will be associated
with greater subsequent response distortion.
It should be reiterated that, while individual components of Vroom’s (1964) model have
been incorporated into a wide variety of studies, few studies (and no published journal articles
concerning applicant faking on personality inventories) have explicitly included the three-way
interaction between valence, instrumentality, and expectancy judgments that forms the crux of
Vroom’s (1964) theory. This is fairly surprising, given the prevalence of Vroom’s expectancy
theory within the motivation literature and recent calls (Ellingson, 2011) for the incorporation of
this framework into the study of response distortion and other forms of organizational deviance.
It is clear that Vroom (1964) was speaking from a logically sound standpoint when he stated that
all three types of judgments need to be present and favorable to some degree in order to allow for
sufficient motivational force to compel action. For example, an individual would be less likely to
muster the motivation necessary to fake a personality inventory if they did not believe that they
could successfully distort their responses on the inventory (low expectancy judgment), even if
they felt that the job itself was highly desirable (high valence judgment) and understood that
favorable scores on the instrument are inextricably linked with their prospects of attaining it
(high instrumentality judgments). In such a scenario, the individual impacts of valence and
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instrumentality judgments on subsequent response distortion behavior, as well as that of the twoway interaction of said variables, would be mitigated. However, the impact of valence and
instrumentality judgments on subsequent response distortion behavior should be strengthened if
an individual possessed high levels of expectancy and believes that they can successfully distort
their responses to make themselves appear to be a desirable candidate.
This study seeks in part to fill this gap in the literature by applying this classic and oftcited theory, in a manner consistent with Vroom’s (1964) original writing, to the area of response
distortion on personality inventories in an attempt to gain a more thorough understanding of the
motivational antecedents of this behavior. Doing so will afford us a greater understanding of the
potential interplay between the multiple different types of situational perceptions that may
govern not only response distortion, but all manners of deviant behavior. As such,
Hypothesis 4: Motivational force, defined as the three way interaction between valence,
instrumentality, and expectancy will be associated with greater response distortion and will
account for unique variance in subsequent response distortion on a personality inventory beyond
the direct effects of each individual variable.
While Vroom (1964) does indeed specify a three-way interaction between valence,
instrumentality, and expectancy judgments, all possible direct effects (and two-way interactions)
of these variables on subsequent response distortion will be examined as an exploratory measure
due to the existence of prior research which has found effects of this nature (see Van Eerde &
Thierry, 1996).
Motivated, but Able?
While individuals likely differ regarding the valence, instrumentality, and expectancy
judgments that they make regarding distorting their responses on a personality inventory, it is
likely that the majority of applicants for positions will be motivated to distort their responses at
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least to some degree. However, having sufficient motivation to attempt to complete an action and
successfully completing said action are two different things. Making oneself appear to be a good
candidate for a position regardless of one’s actual standing on the latent traits used in a selection
inventory is an effortful task requiring a fair amount of skill on the part of the respondent. Doing
so requires determining which traits are considered desirable within a given position, examining
item content to select the most appropriate response, and in many settings, detecting items
measuring social desirability or items with “bogus” answers designed to detect fakers, and
responding accordingly (Austin , 2002; Levashina, Morgeson, & Campion, 2009). As such,
successfully engaging in faking on a personality inventory requires not only sufficient
motivation, but sufficient ability as well.
A tremendous body of research suggests that general mental ability, defined for the
purposes of this study as “the ability to deal with cognitive complexity, and in particular with
complex information processing demands” (pp. 92, Gottfredson, 1997), is one of the most
important individual differences for predicting task performance in a wide variety of domains
(Schmidt & Hunter, 1998; Schmidt & Hunter, 2004). This is particularly true when the task in
question requires complex information processing (Hunter, 1986). Researchers have long
observed that there is a relationship between intelligence and the ability to successfully deceive
others, with Charles Darwin (1877) observing that his children’s ability to lie skillfully (that is,
providing information that is seemingly plausible, albeit false) increased as their cognitive
faculties became more sophisticated throughout childhood. Interestingly, modern child
development researchers have even tied improvements in the ability to lie with milestones in
cognitive development (Evans & Lee, 2011; Evans, Xu, & Lee, 2011).
In order for an applicant to successfully distort their responses, they must first be able to
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identify the dimensions that are targeted by the selection tool in question. Prior research suggests
that this skill is largely driven by general cognitive ability, with participants who are proficient at
identifying pertinent criteria on structured interviews (Melchers, Klehe, Richter, Kleinmann,
König, & Lievens, 2009) garnering far more favorable evaluations from interviewers relative to
their less skillful counterparts. In another study which was conducted among recent university
graduates in Switzerland, cognitive ability was found to be related to the ability to identify
pertinent criteria on both a structured interview and among assessment center exercises, with this
ability being highly related to performance ratings on both selection methods. In fact, prior
research has shown that the relationships between scores on structured interview and assessment
center exercises and supervisor-rated performance criteria are attenuated into nonsignificance
once the ability to identify pertinent criteria is accounted for (Jansen et al., 2013; also see Ingold,
Kleinmann, König, Melchers, & Van Iddekinge, 2015 and König, Melchers, Kleinmann, Richter,
& Klehe, 2007). Within the domain of personality assessments, prior research has found that
cognitive ability is associated with the ability to successfully distort responses on personality
inventories in order to match the personality profiles deemed desirable by subject matter experts
for candidates in a wide variety of positions (Tett, Freund, Christiansen, Fox, & Coaster, 2012).
As such, it seems clear that the ability to successfully fake responses on selection instruments,
personality measures included, is largely contingent upon general mental ability.
Ultimately, an applicant’s tendency to successfully portray themselves in a desirable
manner on selection inventories is likely due not only to their motivation distort their responses,
but on their ability to do so as well. Prior research has supported the notion that successful task
performance is contingent upon both ability-related and motivational factors (Cerasoli, 2015;
Locke, 1965), and as an endeavor which is both cognitively taxing and likely driven by
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motivational forces, successful response distortion will likely be the product of both the
judgments posited in Vroom’s (1964) work and general mental ability.
Prior research has suggested that valence judgments (i.e., job desirability) are associated
with self-reported test-taking motivation and scores on a knowledge test used for selection
purposes by a law enforcement organization (Sanchez et al., 2010). This is in line with prior
research which suggests that job-related valence judgments can broadly be associated with
behaviors aimed at increasing one’s chances of job attainment (Bauer et al., 2015; Porfeli et al.,
2012; Porfeli et al., 2013). As such, it stands to reason that valence judgments will also be
associated with faking on self-report personality inventories. However, being able to deceptively
respond to items in a personality inventory in a manner which substantively improves one’s
score is largely influenced by one’s cognitive ability (Pauls & Crost, 2005; Tett et al., 2012).
While it is likely that applicants who view the job to which they are applying as extremely
desirable will be more likely to engage in a wide variety of behaviors, including faking, aimed at
increasing their chances of being hired, they will be unsuccessful at substantively improving
their scores via faking if they lack the requisite cognitive ability to do so. As such,
Hypothesis 5: Cognitive ability will moderate the relationship between valence judgments and
subsequent response distortion, such that the relationship between valence judgments and
subsequent response distortion will become stronger as cognitive ability increases.
Similarly, while few studies in the organizational sciences have examined interaction
effects between instrumentality judgments and cognitive ability for predicting subsequent
behavior, some prior research may allow us to infer the existence of such phenomena. In a study
which administered both personality and cognitive ability inventories to applicants and job
incumbents, significant positive correlations between scores on the personality inventories and
scores on the cognitive ability inventories were found among the applicant population, but not
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among job incumbents (Levashina, Weekly, Roulin, & Hauck, 2014). In this study, the applicant
and incumbent samples are likely distinguishable largely due to the effects of their positions on
instrumentality judgments regarding performance on the examination. While the applicant
sample likely had sufficiently high instrumentality judgments to motivate response distortion,
such instrumentality judgments were unlikely to be present among the incumbent sample. This is
because A) as job incumbents, they had already attained the distal outcome associated with
performance on the inventory and B) the inventory was being administered by an external firm
who assured incumbents that their scores on these inventories would remain anonymous and
were not to be shared with management. As such, I contend that while the perceived relationship
between scores on a selection inventory and subsequent selection decisions likely motivates
subsequent response distortion, these judgments will only manifest in successful distortion if the
applicant possesses sufficient levels of cognitive ability.
Hypothesis 6: Cognitive ability will moderate the relationship between instrumentality judgments
and subsequent response distortion, such that the relationship between instrumentality
judgments and subsequent response distortion will become stronger as cognitive ability
increases.
While favorable expectancy judgments regarding a specific task can generally be
associated with high levels of motivation (Bandura, 1997), they are unlikely to be enough to
engender successful response distortion. Recent research suggests that individuals who show
ineptitude within a particular domain have difficulty accurately judging their performance in that
area (Sheldon, Dunning, & Ames, 2014). As such, an individual’s perception of their own ability
to successfully engage in a certain activity may not necessarily be a good representation of their
ability to successfully do so. While prior research has suggested that expectancy judgments
regarding response distortion on self-report personality inventories are generally associated with
higher levels of response distortion (McFarland & Ryan, 2006; Pauls & Crost, 2005), there are
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likely many job applicants who are highly confident in their ability to engage in faking, yet lack
the cognitive ability to do so effectively (Klehe et al., 2012; Tett et al., 2012). As such,
Hypothesis 7: Cognitive ability will moderate the relationship between expectancy judgments
and subsequent response distortion, such that the relationship between expectancy judgments
and subsequent response distortion will become stronger as cognitive ability increases.
The Influence of Integrity
Another individual difference which may moderate the relationship between the factors
discussed in Vroom’s (1964) theory and subsequent response distortion is applicant integrity.
Integrity is defined as a non-ability individual difference characterized by a proclivity towards
sincerity, fairness, modesty, and the avoidance of greed (Lee & Ashton, 2004). Integrity tests
were popularized as a selection instrument following public outrage regarding the use of
polygraph tests for selection purposes (Sackett, Burris, & Callahan, 1989). Such tests can
broadly be divided into overt integrity tests, which explicitly ask respondents about prior deviant
behavior (e.g., theft or drug use) and personality-based measures, which typically include items
pertaining to a sundry of individual differences including thrill seeking, honesty, hostility, and
attitudes towards authority (Sackett, 1994). These personality-based measures of integrity have
previously been shown to generally outperform both their overt counterparts and conventional
big five inventories for predicting a wide variety of deviant behaviors, including theft and
absenteeism among employees (Ones, Viswesvaran, & Schmidt, 1993; Ones, Viswesvaran, &
Schmit, 2003; Van Iddekinge, Roth, Raymark, & Odle-Dusseau, 201210) in addition to cheating
among college students (Lucas & Friedrich, 2005). These findings provide some reassurance
regarding the construct validity of such inventories (Mumford, Connelly, Helton, Strange, &

10

Ironically, these studies also found that the criterion-related validities of integrity tests are generally much
higher when reported by the test publisher.
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Osburn, 2001). Given that deliberate faking on personality inventories for selection purposes
conforms to Robinson and Bennett’s (1995) definition of organizational deviance11, it is
unsurprising that prior research has linked scores on integrity tests with subsequent response
distortion on personality inventories. Most notably, in a study in which a large sample of people
were reapplying for a customer service position several months after an initial rejection,
individuals who had high scores on a personality-based integrity test during their initial
application were less likely to inflate their scores on socially desirable traits such as
conscientiousness when reapplying to the position several months later (Hogan, Barrett, &
Hogan, 2007).
Prior theorists have contended that an applicant's moral standing influences valence
judgments regarding a particular position (Ellingson & McFarland, 2011) because individuals
with high integrity will come to view the position with distaste if deception is required to attain
it. However, this appears to be inconsistent with Vroom’s (1964) description of valence
judgments as pertaining to one’s attitude towards a specific distal outcome rather than the means
employed to attain said outcome. Furthermore, the findings of Hogan et al (2007) are unlikely to
be explained by systematic differences in valence judgments between high-integrity and lowintegrity applicants. All of the applicants included in this study found the customer service
position sufficiently attractive to warrant reapplication following an initial rejection, regardless
of their scores on a measure of integrity administered months before. Provided that there are not
ethical issues inherent to the nature of the job itself, an individual’s valence judgments regarding
said job should be unlikely to be affected by their level of integrity. Rather, high levels of
integrity will likely cause an applicant to a position to view the deception inherent to response

11

Robinson & Bennett (p. 556; 1995) define deviance as "voluntary behavior that violates significant organizational
norms and in so doing threatens the well-being of an organization, its members, or both"
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distortion as being unethical (Griffith, Malm, English, Yoshida, & Gujar, 2006), potentially
reducing the extent to which applicants will succumb to the temptation to engage in ethically
dubious responding (Day, Hudson, Dobies, & Waris, 2011).
High levels of integrity can potentially serve as a bulwark which can possibly reduce the
extent to which high levels of valence, instrumentality, and expectancy judgments lead to
subsequent response distortion. While once again, there seems to be a relative paucity of existing
studies which examine the cumulative influence of integrity and the situational assessments
described in Vroom’s (1964) writing, we may still be able to infer the presence of such effects.
For example, the sample of individuals in the Hogan et al., (2007) study who were reapplying to
the customer service position several months after an initial rejection likely had universally high
valence assessments regarding the position. The fact that these participants had a period of
several months to search for (and potentially attain) alternative employment, suggesting that the
position in question was viewed as highly desirable relative to alternatives that were available to
participants in this sample. Nevertheless, those with higher scores on an integrity test were less
likely to demonstrate substantive changes in their scores on socially desirable traits from one
administration to the next. As such, even if an applicant views the job to which they are applying
as being highly desirable relative to potential alternative positions, they will be unwilling to
engage in voluntary response distortion if they have very high levels of integrity. As such,
Hypothesis 8: Integrity will moderate the relationship between valence judgments and
subsequent response distortion, such that the relationship will become weaker with increasing
levels of applicant integrity.
Similarly, while high levels of perceived instrumentality between scores on personality
inventories and subsequent hiring decisions may potentially cause one to be motivated to engage
in response distortion, individuals high on integrity will likely be unwilling to engage in behavior
that compromises their values. It could be argued that many forms of deviant behavior in the
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workplace, including response distortion, are driven by a desire to attain a desired outcome.12 For
example, employees who do not feel as if they are being compensated appropriately may engage
in behaviors such as theft in an apparent effort to satisfy the goal of attaining sufficient
compensation (Marcus & Schuler, 2004). However, individuals high on integrity may be less
willing to engage in deviant behaviors relative to their peers, even if a desired outcome is on the
line. As such,
Hypothesis 9: Integrity will moderate the relationship between instrumentality judgments
and subsequent response distortion, such that the relationship will become weaker with
increasing levels of applicant integrity.
In addition to valence assessments, high levels of applicant integrity may also attenuate
the impact of high expectancy judgments regarding response distortion on subsequent behavior.
In a large-scale study of college students, it was found that scores on a measure of academic
integrity were associated with lower levels of self-reported cheating behavior even among those
who reported that they would anticipate a low chance of being caught should they elect to cheat
(Miller, Shoptaugh, & Wooldridge, 2011). Ultimately, I contend that while an individual may
feel as if they are able to successfully distort their responses on a personality inventory that is
being used for selection purposes, such behavior may stand in contradiction to the values of
individuals who possess high levels of integrity (Pulfrey & Butera, 2015), ultimately reducing
the extent to which such judgments impact subsequent response distortion behavior. As such,
Hypothesis 10: Integrity will moderate the relationship between expectancy judgments
and subsequent response distortion, such that the relationship will become weaker with
increasing levels of applicant integrity.

12

This is not to underscore the role that affect likely plays as well.
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CHAPTER THREE: SCALE DEVELOPMENT STUDY

A pilot study was conducted in order to develop the scales necessary for measuring
participants’ valence, instrumentality, and expectancy judgments regarding faking on self-report
personality inventories within a selection context. I began by reviewing prior studies which have
assessed valence, instrumentality, and expectancy judgments using self-report measures (e.g.,
Renko, Kroeck, & Bullough, 2012; Sanchez et al., 2000). At this point, I drafted sixteen items
each pertaining to valence, instrumentality, and expectancy judgments. These items were then
shown to nine doctoral students in industrial and organizational psychology who were asked to
rate the extent to which each item corresponded with valence, instrumentality, and expectancy
judgments on a five-point Likert scale. Only items who received average ratings of at least four
for the targeted judgment type and average ratings of no more than two for the non-targeted
judgment types were retained for further analysis. For example, the item “I can get a good score
if I fake my answers on a personality test” was intended to measure participants’ expectancy
judgments and received average ratings of 4.67 for the extent to which it was representative of
expectancy, 1.22 for the extent to which it represents valence, and a 2.22 for the extent to which
is represents instrumentality. As such, this item was removed. Ultimately, this procedure resulted
in the removal of four items from the pool of possible instrumentality items, and six items from
the pool of possible expectancy items.
Following the initial content validation ratings, a sample of 562 participants was
collected using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk in order to investigate the psychometric properties of
the proposed scales. Following Amazon’s recommendations, I only allowed people with good
records of performance (defined as having at least 98% of their prior work approved by Amazon
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Mechanical Turk service requestors) to participate in the pilot study. In addition, the survey used
contained two quality control items in order to detect inattentive respondents (Barger & Sinar,
2011). Following the removal of participants who failed at least one of the quality control items,
538 participants remained. This sample was 51% male with an average age of 34.28 years (SD =
10.70).
Upon signing up for the study, participants completed a brief demographic questionnaire
before being shown several items from the International Personality Item Pool and told that tests
with similar items are oftentimes used for hiring purposes (please see page 73 in the Appendix
for the specific text). At this point participants completed the remaining proposed expectancy
items. Following this, participants were shown a job posting (please see page 74 in the
Appendix) before being asked to complete the remaining proposed valence items. At this point,
participants were asked to imagine that they were given a personality test while applying for the
job in the aforementioned job posting before completing the remaining proposed instrumentality
items. Participants were then informed of the purpose of the pilot study and compensated for
their participation.
At this point, an exploratory factor analysis was conducted using data from one half (N =
269) of the participants (factor loadings can be found starting on page 75 of the Appendix).
Varimax rotation was used because I did not expect that the factors would be strongly
intercorrelated. While the rotated pattern of factor loadings roughly corresponded with the
intended constructs, certain items were removed from the scales either due to cross-loading onto
multiple factors or loading primarily onto factors other than the one shared by the other items on
the same scale. I selected items to be included on the final scales primarily based on the strength
of their loadings onto the intended factors. However, due to a desire to make scales as concise as
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possible, I also removed items if they were redundant with other items that had larger factor
loadings13 or if their inclusion did not meaningfully improve the internal consistency of the
scale14.
Below are the three scales following the removal of these items.
Valence (α = .96)
1. I would like having this job.
2. This job is appealing to me.
3. I want to be hired for this job.
4. This job suits my needs.
5. This job is appealing relative to other options that I have available.
6. This job is a good fit for me.
Instrumentality (α = .92)
1. Having a good score on the personality test is necessary if you want to be hired.
2. Whether or not you get hired depends on your scores on the personality test.
3. Doing well on the personality test is critical if you want to be hired.
4. Being hired largely depends on scores on the personality test.
5. You must do well on the personality test in order to be hired.
6. Scores on the personality test are a big part of the hiring decision.
Expectancy (α = .88)
1. I can figure out which answers will give me the best score on the personality test.
2. I can figure out the answers that people are looking for when I take the personality test.
3. I can get a good score on the personality test if I try to pick the “best” answers.
4. Faking your answers on personality tests isn’t difficult.
At this point, a confirmatory factor analysis was conducted using one half of the
participants from the pilot study (N = 269)15 using IBM AMOS 23 in order to examine model fit.
The results of the analysis suggests that the proposed model fit the data well (χ2 = 154.66, df =

13

For example, I removed the draft valence item “I would like to get this job” even though it had a strong factor
loading (λ = .935) because it was thematically redundant with the item “I would like to get this job”, which had a
slightly higher factor loading (λ = .944).
14
For example, including the draft expectancy item “I can be deceptive when taking the personality test” only
improves α by .002 beyond the four-item scale.
15
Note that these participants were not the ones whose data was used to conduct the aforementioned
exploratory factor analysis.
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101, TLI = .98, CFI = .98, RMSEA = .05, RMR = .05). The model that was examined, along
with standardized parameter estimates, can be found below.

Figure 1: Standardized Parameter Estimates from Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Valence, Instrumentality, and Expectancy
Scales in the Pilot Sample
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CHAPTER FOUR: PRIMARY STUDY

Participants

Participants in this study were 755 undergraduate students at a large public university in
the southeastern United States who participated in exchange for course credit. Participants were
recruited using SONA systems, the university’s research participant recruitment platform. This
sample was 66% female with an average age of 19.64 years (SD = 4.37). 63.2% of the sample
identified as being non-Hispanic white.
Measures
Integrity
Integrity was measured using the 16-item honesty/humility scale from the HEXACO-PIR (α = .73). While it may initially seem odd to operationalize integrity in this manner, prior
research has found convergent validity of both self and peer-ratings on the honesty-humility
factor with both preexisting integrity tests and scores on an ethical business decision making task
(Lee & Ashton, 2004; Lee, Ashton, Morrison, Cordery, & Dunlop, 2008).
Cognitive Ability
Cognitive ability was assessed using the Wonderlic Personnel Test (WPT-R), a wellknown computerized adaptive test of cognitive ability which displays convergent validity with
other tests of cognitive ability (Bell, Matthews, Lassister, & Leverett, 2002). Though this
measure is not publically available, I was permitted to use it as part of my study as part of a
research agreement with Wonderlic.
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Five-Factor Personality
Five-factor personality data was measured using the publicly available IPIP-Big Five
Factor Markers inventory. This inventory consists of 100 items (twenty for each five-factor trait)
and has previously demonstrated favorable psychometric properties (Goldberg, 1992). Scores are
calculated by summing the responses for each of the twenty items for each five-factor trait, such
that possible scores for each trait range from 20 to 100. Due to the highly problematic impact
that missing data would have on scores on this measure, participants were required to complete
all items before being permitted to continue with the experimental survey.
Valence, Instrumentality, and Expectancy Judgments
Valence (α = .93), instrumentality (α = .91), and expectancy (α = .87) judgments were
assessed using the aforementioned scales.

Procedure

The majority of existing experimental studies focusing on applicant faking on self-report
personality inventories have incorporated experimental paradigms in which participants are
explicitly instructed to distort their responses on a measure (see Ellingson et al., 2001; Pauls &
Crost, 2005; Stark et al., 2001; Tett et al., 2012). However, prior meta-analyses have shown that
faking effect sizes in these instructed-faking studies are oftentimes far greater than those found in
real-world settings (Birkeland et al., 2006; Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999). This has led some
researchers to express concerns that the cognitive processes underlying faking in these directed30

faking studies are qualitatively distinct from those that drive faking in real-world scenarios
(Ellingson & McFarland, 2011; Mueller-Hanson et al., 2006). For example, a real-world
applicant who is engaging in response distortion may take steps to avoid selecting options that
are “too good” due to concerns about being identified as somebody who is engaging in faking,
whereas such pressures are absent in directed-faking studies. As such, the current study used an
experimental paradigm similar to those used in studies by Ellingson, Heggestad, and Makarius
(2011) and Peterson et al. (2009), in which deception is incorporated. In both of these studies,
researchers told participants that they were collaborating with an external organization in order
to develop a personality assessment that was going to be used for selection purposes, and that
participants would be completing this assessment. In order to incentivize participants to engage
in faking without explicitly instructing them to do so, participants in both studies were told that
they would be contacted in order to interview for a desirable position16 if their scores on the
personality assessment were considered appropriate. As such, this study incorporated a similar
experimental procedure in hopes of producing faking behavior that is analogous to that which is
found in real-world settings.
Upon consenting to participate in the study, participants followed a link to the
experimental website, which was hosted using Qualtrics. Participants then completed a brief
demographic questionnaire before completing the HEXACO PI-R Honesty/Humility measure.
Next, participants had to complete the Wonderlic PI-R, which was hosted on Wonderlic’s online
platform. In order to link the data from Wonderlic’s platform with that from the rest of the
experimental data, participants were asked to enter a unique personal identifier on both the
Wonderlic and Qualtrics platforms.
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In the Ellingson et al. (2012) study, this was a position in a fictional corporation’s leadership development
program, whereas in the Peterson et al. (2009) study, this was a customer service position with a consulting firm.
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Following the completion of the Wonderlic PI-R, participants completed two different
expectancy measures. In order to avoid inadvertently divulging the purpose of the study to
participants, participants completed expectancy measures pertaining to both personality and
integrity measures17. Prior to each expectancy measure, participants read a brief description
about how these measures are used for selection purposes. Participants were then shown several
examples of items from publically-available personality and integrity assessments before
completing expectancy measures that referenced both integrity and personality, respectively (see
page 77-78 of the Appendix).
At this point, participants were shown a job posting for a position as an account manager
within a healthcare technology firm (see page 80 of the Appendix) before being asked to
complete the valence measure. The position described was intended to be a realistic first job for a
recent graduate with a bachelor’s degree in the social sciences or business. Because many realworld job postings contain descriptions of the desired personal characteristics of an applicant, the
posting also contained hints about what personality characteristics would be viewed favorably18.
After participants viewed the job description, they read a short block of text in which they
were told that I was collaborating with a company in order to A) develop a personality test that
was going to be used to select candidates for the account management position that was just
described to them B) learn more about how selection tests are perceived by job applicants.
Participants were then told that that they will be contacted by the company in the future in order
to interview for an account manager position if their scores on the personality assessment were
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I would like to thank the committee member who raised this issue during my dissertation proposal.
The hints were “comfortable engaging people in professional settings”, “able to get along with others”, “detailoriented”, “remain calm under pressure” and “open to a wide variety of experiences and duties”. These were
intended to imply that high levels of extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, and
openness were considered desirable.
18
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compatible with the demands of the position and if they consented to have their data shared with
the company. Next, participants were told that the final selection battery used was going to
include personality, integrity, and cognitive ability assessments in addition to several interviews
before completing four separate instrumentality measures that referenced personality, integrity,
and cognitive ability assessments, respectively. Participants then had to indicate whether or not
they consented to be contacted by the company regarding an interview, should their scores on the
personality test prove to be compatible with the demands of the job. In order to enhance realism,
participants were also given the option of uploading a resume.19 Participants were then told that
they were going to take the current version of the personality assessment that was being
developed before completing the IPIP Big Five Factor Markers inventory.
At this point, the experimental deception was revealed to participants. Participants were
told that I was not in fact collaborating with an external organization in order to develop a test
for selection purposes and were then told that they would be completing the personality
inventory for a second time without any possible social pressure to respond to items in a
particular way. Participants then completed the IPIP Big Five Factor Markers Inventory for a
second time before being debriefed.

19

Though only 47 of the 755 participants uploaded a resume at this point.
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CHAPTER FIVE: ANALYSES
Quality Control
Due to concerns about the potential for inattentive respondents, two quality control items
(Barger & Sinar, 2011) were embedded within the experimental survey in order to identify
inattentive respondents. Out of the 755 participants in the initial dataset, 233 failed at least one of
these quality control items. The data from these participants was removed from the dataset
before I proceeded with further analysis. In order to ensure that the participants in the final
sample were as similar as possible to real-world job applicants, the data from participants who
had indicated that they were not interested in being contacted regarding an interview by the
fictional external organization was also removed from the sample before I proceeded with further
analysis. This resulted in the removal of an additional 299 participants from the dataset, resulting
in a final sample size of 223 participants.
A second confirmatory factor analysis was conducted in order to ensure that the proposed
factor structure for valence, instrumentality, and expectancy judgments was upheld in the
primary study as well. The results of the analysis suggests that the proposed model fit the data
fairly well (χ2 = 204.18, df = 101, TLI = .95, CFI = .96, RMSEA = .07, RMR = .06).
Standardized parameter estimates can be found below.
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Figure 2: Standardized Parameter Estimates from Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Valence, Instrumentality, and Expectancy
Scales in the Primary Sample.

It should be noted that while satisfactory model fit was attained, multiple parameter
estimates changed dramatically from the pilot study to the primary sample. Most notably, the
correlation between valence and expectancy dropped substantially from the pilot study (r = .18,
p < .05) to the primary study (r = -.03, n.s.).
Manipulation Check
Within subjects difference scores were examined in order to verify that the experimental
manipulation induced participants to engage in response distortion. Scores for extraversion
(t(222) = 4.18, p < .01, d = .17), agreeableness (t(222) = 4.02, p < .01, d = .14),
conscientiousness (t(222) = 4.18, p < .01, d = .17), emotional stability (t(222) = 3.53, p < .01, d =
.15), and openness (t(222) = 3.07, p < .01, d = .12), were significantly higher in the applicant
condition administration of the IPIP Big Five Factor Markers Inventory than they were on the
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second administration of the inventory, after the experimental manipulation had been revealed to
participants. It should be noted that the average within-subjects difference scores were generally
small across all five traits (extraversion: M = 2.36, SD = 8.44; agreeableness: M = 1.60, SD =
8.44; conscientiousness: M = 2.18, SD = 7.80; emotional stability: M = 2.29, SD = 9.68;
openness: M = 1.29, SD = 6.29) because many participants simply did not engage in faking on
the personality inventory.
Prior studies in which multiple administrations of a personality assessment were given to
real-world job applicants has suggested that a relatively small percentage of applicants actually
engage in substantive amounts of response distortion on a given trait in real-world settings
(Arthur et al., 2010; Griffith et al., 2007; Hogan et al., 2007). In order to identify participants
who had engaged in response distortion based on the size of the discrepancy in scores between
the two administrations of the personality inventory, I incorporated a slightly modified version of
a metric introduced by Arthur et al. (2010), the standard error of measurement of difference
scores, as a cutoff:
𝑆𝐸𝑀𝑑 = 1.65𝑠𝑑 √1 − 𝑟𝑥1𝑥2
𝑠𝑑 = standard deviation of the raw difference between time 1 and time 2 scores
𝑟𝑥1𝑥2 = correlation between time 1 and time 2 scores
Because I felt that Arthur et al.’s (2010) original metric was slightly too liberal, I chose to
multiply these values by 1.6520. The resulting 𝑆𝐸𝑀𝑑 values were 4.55 for extraversion, 3.46 for
agreeableness, 4.29 for conscientiousness, 5.53 for emotional stability, and 3.53 for openness.

20

This value was chosen because it is the z value associated with a one-tailed 90% confidence interval on the tdistribution.
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Because all possible scores on the IPIP Big Five Factor Markers Inventory are whole numbers, in
practice this meant that in order to be identified as having engaged in faking on a particular trait,
participants had to have applicant condition scores that were 5 points greater than non-applicant
condition scores for extraversion, 4 points greater for agreeableness, 5 points greater for
conscientiousness, 6 points greater for emotional stability, and 4 points greater for openness.
Based on these criteria, 39 participants (17.5%) were flagged as having engaged in faking on
extraversion, 48 (21.5%) on agreeableness, 41 (18.4%) on conscientiousness, 38 (17%) on
emotional stability, and 41 (18.4%) on openness21. In total, 105 (47.1%) of participants were
flagged as having engaged in faking on at least one trait.
Prior researchers have noted that raw within-subject difference scores can demonstrate
spurious relationships with other experimental variables, (Christiansen, Burns, & Montgomery,
2005), such that variables that are positively correlated with participant’s scores in an “honest”
condition will be negatively correlated with the raw difference score, even though they may in
fact have no substantive relationship with changes in scores between honest and faking
conditions. Due to this issue, I followed the recommendations of Burns and Christiansen (2011)
and used regression-adjusted difference scores in lieu of raw difference scores as the dependent
variable in all tests of hypotheses. Regression-adjusted difference scores are computed by
regressing scores from the faking condition onto scores from the honest condition and saving the
unstandardized residual. As such, regression-adjusted difference scores are interpreted as the part
of the scores from the faking condition that cannot be explained by scores in the honest

21

These figures are somewhat lower than those found in Arthur et al.’s (2010) field sample, who found that
between 14% and 36% of applicants engaged in faking of individual traits, though it should be noted that the cutoff
implemented in this study was more conservative.
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condition. While the majority of commonly used statistical software programs provide methods
of saving these scores, they can also be computed manually using the following formula:
YF.H = XF − [XHbF.H + a]
bF.H = the unstandardized regression coefficient
a = the intercept of the formula generated by regressing scores from the faking condition onto scores from the honest
condition
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CHAPTER SIX: RESULTS
As shown in Table 1, Hypothesis 1 was partially supported. Scores on the valence
measure were significantly correlated with the regression-adjusted difference scores for
extraversion (r(221) = .13, p < .05), agreeableness (r(221) = .17, p < .05), and conscientiousness
(r(221) = .17, p < .05). However, scores on the valence measure were not significantly associated
with regression-adjusted difference scores on the emotional stability (r(221) = .11, n.s.) and
openness (r(221) = .07, n.s.) measures.
Hypothesis 2 was partially supported. Scores on the instrumentality measure were
positively associated with the regression-adjusted difference scores for conscientiousness (r(221)
= .13, p < .05). However, scores on the instrumentality measure were not significantly correlated
with regression-adjusted difference scores on the extraversion (r(221) = -.02, n.s.), agreeableness
(r(221) = .12, n.s.), emotional stability (r(221) = .10, n.s.), and openness (r(221) = -.02, n.s.).
Hypothesis 3 was also partially supported. Scores on the expectancy measure were
positively associated with the regression-adjusted difference scores for agreeableness (r(221) =
.19, p < .01), emotional stability (r(221) = .18, p < .01), and openness (r(221) = .14, p < .05).
However, scores on the expectancy measure were not significantly correlated with the
regression-adjusted difference scores for extraversion (r(221) = .11, n.s.) or conscientiousness
(r(221) = .09, n.s.).
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics and correlations between study variables

M
SD
1
2
1. Valence
3.11 1.02
.93
2. Instrumentality
3.27 0.79
.30
.91
3. Expectancy
3.60 0.88
-.06
.17
4. HEXACO PI-R Honesty Humility
3.17 0.53
.12
.04
5. Wonderlic PI-R
24.36
5.04
-.16 -.08
6. Extraversion Honest Condition
68.44 14.65
.16
.10
7. Extraversion Faking Condition
70.81 13.04
.21
.07
8. Extraversion Regression Adjusted Difference Score
0.00 7.46
.13 -.02
9. Agreeableness Honest Condition
81.33 12.09
.17
.18
10. Agreeableness Faking Condition
82.93 10.69
.23
.21
11. Agreeableness Regression Adjusted Difference Score
0.00 5.26
.17
.12
12. Conscientiousness Honest Condition
78.61 13.50
.16
.08
13. Conscientiousness Faking Condition
80.79 11.46
.23
.14
14. Conscientiousness Regression Adjusted Difference Score
0.00 6.60
.17
.13
15. Emotional Stability Honest Condition
69.97 15.05
.16
.01
16. Emotional Stability Faking Condition
72.26 14.51
.20
.07
17. Emotional Stability Regression Adjusted Difference Score
0.00 8.97
.11
.10
18. Openness Honest Condition
78.23 10.90
.15
.11
19. Openness Faking Condition
79.52
9.86
.16
.08
20. Openness Regression Adjusted Difference Score
0.00 5.63
.07 -.02
Note: Correlations above .12 are significant at p < .05, correlations above .17 are significant at p < .01
N = 223, N = 194 for coefficients involving the Wonderlic PI-R
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3

4

5

6

7

.87
-.31
.11
-.14
-.05
.11
-.06
.04
.19
-.07
.00
.09
-.18
-.03
.18
-.05
.04
.14

.73
-.10
-.01
-.04
-.06
.33
.28
-.02
.22
.18
.01
.21
.11
-.10
.18
.10
-.09

--.10
-.01
.12
-.06
-.01
.07
.01
.08
.13
.12
.25
.25
.04
.16
.23

.93
.82
.00
.35
.27
-.05
.35
.22
-.12
.49
.26
-.20
.44
.29
-.12

.91
.57
.29
.35
.20
.23
.31
.21
.44
.44
.15
.38
.42
.19

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
-9.
0.01
.92
10.
0.22
0.87
.91
11.
0.43
0.00
0.49
-12.
-0.10
0.40
0.29
-0.11
.93
13.
0.23
0.38
0.43
0.20
0.82
.91
14.
0.54
0.09
0.33
0.51
0.00
0.58
-15.
0.07
0.28
0.24
0.01
0.45
0.39
0.03
.93
16.
0.39
0.21
0.33
0.29
0.26
0.45
0.41
0.79
.93
17.
0.55
-0.01
0.22
0.46
-0.16
0.23
0.63
0.00
0.62
-18.
0.04
0.49
0.39
-0.06
0.50
0.44
0.06
0.35
0.25
-0.04
.90
19.
0.33
0.37
0.46
0.28
0.31
0.45
0.35
0.27
0.37
0.26
0.82
20.
0.51
-0.06
0.24
0.59
-0.18
0.17
0.54
-0.03
0.29
0.51
0.00
Note: Correlations above .12 are significant at p < .05, correlations above .17 are significant at p < .01
N = 223, N = 194 for coefficients involving the Wonderlic PI-R

N = 223, N = 209 for coefficients involving the Wonderlic PI-R
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19

20

.88
0.57

--

Table 2: Hierarchical Regression Analyses Predicting Regression-Adjusted Difference Scores for Extraversion, Agreeableness,
Conscientiousness, Emotional Stability, and Openness From Valence, Instrumentality, and Expectancy

Trait
Extraversion
ΔR
Step 1

2

β

.04*

Agreeableness
ΔR

2

Conscientiousness

β

.07**

ΔR

2

β

.04*

Emotional
Stability
2
β
ΔR

ΔR

.05*

.03

Valence
Instrumentality
Expectancy
Step 2

.17**

.17**

-.10

.04

.14*

.20**

.01

Valence
Instrumentality
Expectancy
Valence x
Instrumentality
Instrumentality
x Expectancy
Valence x
Expectancy
Step 3

.16*

Valence
Instrumentality
Expectancy
Valence x
Instrumentality
Instrumentality
x Expectancy
Valence x
Expectancy
Valence x
Instrumentality
x Expectancy
2

Total R

.05*

β

.10

.07

-.02

-.07

.09

.18**

.01

.01

.17*

.16*

-.09

.05

.13

.19**

.00

-.06

.00
-.10
.00

2

.12

.15**

.01

Openness

.16*
.01

.13

.12

.08

.02

-.08

.08

.19**

.16*

-.08

-.01

.01

.07

.01

.05

.07

.05

.07

-.11

-.06

.01

.02*

.17*

.19*

-.09

.06

.15*

.01

.00
.16*

.11

.08

.02

-.09

.22**

.13

.23**

.15*

-.00

-.06

-.09

-.01

.01

.01

.07

.01

.01

.09

-.12

.02

.02

-.10

-.07

-.06

-.09

-.16*

-.12

.05

.09**

.19**

.07*

.07*

.04

* p < .05, **p < .01, n = 223

Hierarchical regression analyses were conducted in order to test Hypothesis 4. In order to
test this hypothesis, the regression-adjusted difference score for each trait was regressed onto
scores on the valence, instrumentality, and expectancy measures in the first step. In the second
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step, all possible two-way interaction terms between valence, instrumentality, and expectancy
were added to the model. In the third and final step, the three-way interaction between valence,
instrumentality, and expectancy was added to the model.
Hypothesis 4 was not supported, with the three-way interaction between valence,
instrumentality, and expectancy failing to significantly predict regression adjusted difference
scores for extraversion (β = -.06; t(222) = -.79, n.s.), agreeableness (β = -.09; t(222) = -1.19,
n.s.), emotional stability (β = -.12; t(222) = -1.55, n.s.), and openness (β = .05; t(222) = .61, n.s.).
Curiously, while the three way interaction between valence, instrumentality, and expectancy
significantly predicted regression-adjusted difference scores in conscientiousness (β = -.16;
t(222) = -2.10, p < .05), the coefficient was negative.
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Table 3:Hierarchical Regression Analyses Predicting Regression-Adjusted Difference Scores for Extraversion,
Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Emotional Stability, and Openness From Cognitive Ability, Valence, Instrumentality,
and Expectancy

Trait
Extraversion
Predictor
Step 1

ΔR

2

β

.06*

Valence

Agreeableness
ΔR

2

.07**
.19*

Instrumentality

β

Conscientiousness
ΔR

2

β

.07**

Emotional
Stability
2
β
ΔR
.13**

.11

.18**

Openness
ΔR

2

β

.07**
.11

.10

-.07

.07

.08

.04

-.05

Expectancy

.14

.20**

.10

.21**

.13

Wonderlic PI-R

.13

.07

.15*

.25**

.23**

Step 2

.02

Valence

.01

.01

.00

.01

.19*

.10

.18*

.12

.09

Instrumentality

-.07

.08

.08

.04

-.05

Expectancy

.13

.21**

.10

.20**

.13

Wonderlic PI-R

.12

.07

.14*

.25**

.22**

.01

.06

-.02

-.03

.00

-.06

-.07

-.03

-.00

-.05

.15*

-.01

.09

.00

Valence x
Wonderlic PI-R
Instrumentality
x Wonderlic PIR
Expectancy x
Wonderlic PI-R
2

Total R

.08*

.08*

.00
.09*

.13**

.08*

* p < .05, **p < .01, n = 194

Hypothesis 5 was not supported, with cognitive ability failing to moderate the
relationship between valence and regression-adjusted difference scores for extraversion (β = .01;
t(193) = .12, n.s.), agreeableness (β = .06; t(193) = .73, n.s.), conscientiousness (β = -.02; t(193)
= -.20, n.s.), emotional stability (β = -.03; t(193) = -.37, n.s.), and openness (β = .00; t(193) = .03,
n.s.).
Hypothesis 6 was also not supported, with cognitive ability failing to moderate the
relationship between instrumentality and regression-adjusted difference scores for extraversion
(β = -.06; t(193) = -.62, n.s.), agreeableness (β = -.07; t(193) = -.70, n.s.), conscientiousness (β =
-.03; t(193) = -.28, n.s.), emotional stability (β = -.01; t(193) = -.10, n.s.), and openness (β = .44

.05; t(193) = -.54, n.s.).
Hypothesis 7 was partially supported, with cognitive ability moderating the relationship
between expectancy and regression-adjusted difference scores for extraversion (β = .15; t(193) =
2.04, p < .05). As shown in figrue 1, this interaction effect was such that the relationship between
valence and subsequent response distortion became stronger as cognitive ability increased.
However, this interaction did not operate in the manner in which I had originally expected.
Interestingly, it seems that many participants with high levels of cognitive ability and relatively
low levels of expectancy actually tended to demonstrate lower scores on extraversion when the
personality inventory was completed in the faking condition relative to when they inventory was
completed in the honest condition.

Figure 3: Cognitive ability moderating the relationship between expectancy and regression adjusted difference scores for
extraversion
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Table 4: Hierarchical Regression Analyses Predicting Regression-Adjusted Difference Scores for Extraversion, Agreeableness,
Conscientiousness, Emotional Stability, and Openness From Integrity, Valence, Instrumentality, and Expectancy

Trait
Extraversion
Predictor
Step 1
Valence
Instrumentality
Expectancy
HonestyHumility
Step 2

2

ΔR
.04

2

.07

2

ΔR
.07**

β

Conscientiousness
2

ΔR
.04*

β

Emotional
Stability
2
β
ΔR
.05*

Openness
2

ΔR
.03

β

.17*
-.09
.12

.17*
.04
.21**

.15*
.07
.09

.12
.04
.16*

.11
-.07
.14

-.03

.03

.01

-.07

-.06

.03

Valence
Instrumentality
Expectancy
HonestyHumility
Valence x
HonestyHumility
Instrumentality
x HonestyHumility
Expectancy x
HonestyHumility
Total R

β

Agreeableness

.03*

.01

.04*

.02

.18*
-.09
.15*

.15*
.03
.20**

.15*
.07
.09

.12
.03
.20**

.11
-.07
.16*

-.00

.01

.01

-.02

-.03

.04

-.16*

-.05

.10

-.01

.13

-.04

.05

.00

.11

-.09

-.02

-.02

-.13

-.10

.10**

.05

.09**

.05

* p < .05, **p < .01, n = 223

However, cognitive ability did not moderate the relationship between expectancy and
regression-adjusted difference scores for agreeableness (β = .06; t(193) = .73, n.s.) ,
conscientiousness (β = -.02; t(193) = -.28, n.s.), emotional stability (β = .09; t(193) = 1.23, n.s.),
and openness (β = .00; t(193) = .03, n.s.)
Hypothesis 8 was partially supported, with integrity moderating the relationship between
valence and regression-adjusted difference scores for agreeableness (β = -.16; t(222) = -2.12, p <
.05). As shown in figure 2, this effect was such that the relationship between valence and
subsequent response distortion on the agreeableness scale became weaker as integrity increased.
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As such, people who perceived the job in question as being highly desirable were less likely to
engage in response distortion on the agreeableness scale if they also possessed high levels of
integrity.

Figure 4: Integrity moderating the relationship between valence and regression adjusted difference scores for agreeableness.
Please note that the variables depicted in this chart have been centered.

However, integrity did not moderate the relationship between valence and regressionadjusted difference scores for extraversion (β = .04; t(222) = .51, n.s.), conscientiousness (β = .05; t(222) = -.65, n.s.), emotional stability (β = .10; t(222) = 1.40, n.s.), and openness (β = .01;
t(222) = .10, n.s.).
Hypothesis 9 was also unsupported, with integrity failing to moderate the relationship
between instrumentality and regression-adjusted difference scores for extraversion (β = .13;
t(222) = 1.74, n.s.), agreeableness (β = -.04; t(222) = -.55, n.s.), conscientiousness (β = -.05;
t(222) = .62, n.s.), emotional stability (β = .00; t(222) = .04, n.s.), and openness (β = .11; t(222) =
1.50, n.s.).
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Hypothesis 10 was not supported, with integrity failing to moderate the relationship
between expectancy and regression-adjusted difference scores for extraversion (β = -.09; t(222) =
-1.27, n.s.), agreeableness (β = -.02; t(222) = -.31, n.s.), conscientiousness (β = -.02; t(222) = .21, n.s.), emotional stability (β = -.13; t(222) = -1.81, n.s.), and openness (β = -.10; t(222) = 1.30, n.s.).
To summarize, response distortion appeared to be largely driven by valence and
expectancy judgments. Participants with higher valence judgments (i.e., those who viewed the
job as being more desirable) tended to engage in higher levels of faking on the scales
corresponding to extraversion, agreeableness, and conscientiousness. Participants with higher
instrumentality judgments (i.e., those who tended to perceive scores on the personality inventory
as having a large impact on hiring decisions) tended to engage in higher levels of faking on the
conscientiousness scale. Participants with higher expectancy judgments (i.e., those with higher
levels of self-efficacy regarding their ability to successfully engage in faking) tended to engage
in higher levels of faking on the scales corresponding to agreeableness, openness, and emotional
stability. The three-way interaction term between valence, instrumentality, and expectancy that
Vroom (1964) described in his original theory was not positively related to faking on any of the
five trait scales.22
By and large, integrity and cognitive ability did not demonstrate the anticipated
moderating effects on valence, instrumentality, and expectancy. While cognitive ability did
moderate the relationship between expectancy judgments and subsequent faking on the
extraversion scale, the exact nature of the relationship was surprising because individuals with
high levels of cognitive ability and lower levels of expectancy actually tended to show deflated

22

In the case of conscientiousness, it was actually negatively related to response distortion.
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scores on extraversion when the scale was completed under a quasi-selection situation. The exact
reasons for this are not known at this time, though it is possible that these participants either A)
believed that lower scores on extraversion would be viewed as desirable for the position23 or that
B) they were highly concerned about the potential of being “caught” faking their answers on the
personality inventory at later stages of the selection process (i.e., these participants felt that
unrealistically high scores on extraversion might arouse suspicion if their behavior during a
possible interview doesn’t suggest high levels of extraversion). Given that prior research has
suggested that extraversion is the most readily observable of all of the five factor traits (John &
Robins, 1993; Macan, 2009), I view the latter explanation as being more likely.
Integrity was found to have moderated the relationship between valence judgments (i.e.,
perceived desirability of the job) and response distortion on agreeableness. This relationship was
such that the relationship between valence judgments and subsequent response distortion in
agreeableness grew weaker as integrity increased. However, integrity did not moderate any of
the other relationships between the situational judgments described in Vroom’s (1964) theory
and subsequent response distortion on any trait.

23

Which seems unlikely, given that the job posting was for a customer-facing position.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: DISCUSSION
Implications for Research and Practice
The results of the study pose some interesting questions to researchers and practitioners
hoping to A) gain a better understanding of the antecedents of applicant faking on self-report
personality inventories and B) discourage applicants from engaging in this behavior or otherwise
mitigate the impact of this phenomenon on hiring decisions made in real-world selection
systems.
The impact of valence judgments (i.e. perceived job desirability) on applicant faking
poses a thorny issue for practitioners hoping to limit faking on self-report personality inventories.
Actions taken to reduce the perceived desirability of a job within selection contexts may very
well have the outcome of reducing the number of applicants to a particular position. In addition,
such practices may potentially reduce the overall quality of the applicant pool because highly
qualified applicants may simply elect to seek employment elsewhere. Prior research has shown
that implementing realistic job previews during the selection process may result in lowered
perceptions of job desirability among applicants (Buckley, Mobbs, Mendoza, Novicevic,
Carraher, & Beu, 2002; Phillips, 1998). However, such procedures may fail to mitigate the
impact of valence judgments on response distortion because the applicants who elect to continue
with the application process after being exposed to the information contained in the realistic job
preview likely still perceive the job in question as being desirable relative to other options that
they may have available. As such, while the results of the current study suggest that high valence
judgments may induce applicants to engage in response distortion, interventions aimed at
reducing faking by impacting applicant perceptions of job desirability are unlikely to have the
intended effect.
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One must keep in mind that valence judgments regarding job attainment are inherently
subjective and are likely influenced by the life circumstances of a particular candidate. That is,
candidates with few options available to them may have higher valence judgments regarding a
particular job relative to candidates who are confident in their ability to secure employment
(Ellingson, 2011). As such, macroeconomic factors such as unemployment and/or
underemployment rates may impact the extent to which a particular job is viewed as desirable by
the applicant pool, potentially impacting the prevalence of applicant faking. Admittedly, little
can be done in selection settings to directly address this issue. However, in the event of adverse
economic conditions, practitioners may wish to consider altering the content of operational
selection batteries to place less emphasis on self-report personality inventories and increased
emphasis on ability and/or skill-based tests that are less vulnerable to applicant faking (Lievens,
Peeters, & Schollaert, 2008), such as cognitive ability tests, work samples, and situational
judgment tests. Nevertheless, further research is needed to examine the potential impact of
macroeconomic factors on the prevalence of applicant faking.
Higher instrumentality judgments were associated with higher levels of faking on
conscientiousness. While instrumentality judgments didn’t demonstrate relationships with faking
on as many traits as valence or expectancy judgments, results of the current study still suggest
that under some circumstances the perception that hiring decisions are largely contingent upon
personality test scores may be associated with subsequent faking. A simple way of addressing
this issue is to inform applicants that scores on the personality inventory are merely one of many
criteria that are being considered as part of the selection process. Given that many practitioners
shy away from using multiple hurdles due to the legal issues associated with this approach
(Ployhary & Holtz, 2008), doing so is merely being honest.
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The finding that high expectancy judgments (i.e., high self-efficacy regarding one’s
ability to successfully fake) were associated with higher levels of response distortion on several
traits was altogether unsurprising given some of the prior literature on this subject (McFarland &
Ryan, 2006; Pauls & Crost, 2005). It may seem like this issue could easily be resolved by simply
warning applicants not to engage in faking or that a social desirability scale has been included in
the personality measure, a practice which has been shown in the past to reduce both the
prevalence and magnitude of faking on personality measures (Dwight & Donovan, 2002; Fan et
al., 2012; McFarland, 2000). However, doing so may in and of itself impact the cognitive
processes underlying responses to personality items. In a laboratory study conducted by Burns et
al. (2014), warning participants not to engage in faking on a self-report personality inventory
actually caused participants to “fake down” their scores on traits such as conscientiousness,
demonstrating lower scores on socially desirable traits relative to those collected during a
baseline measurement. As such, overtly warning applicants not to engage in faking itself induce
response distortion, though in such a way that biases applicants towards socially-undesirable
responses. Such warnings may in fact lead to situations in which applicants with relatively high
scores on a particular trait are simply those who chose not to heed warnings not to engage in
faking. In any case, the use of overt warnings intended to discourage faking are unlikely to
prevent the construct validity of personality measurements from being compromised in a
selection situation.
Additional research is needed to impact other means of reducing applicant perceptions of
test fakability, and of the impact of item format on applicant perceptions of test fakability. The
use of forced-choice measures represents a promising means of addressing this issue, and have
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been shown to be less easily faked24 relative to Likert-scale based measures (Christiansen et al.,
2005).
Surprisingly, scores on the Wonderlic PI-R cognitive ability assessment were related to
response distortion on conscientiousness, openness to experience, and emotional stability. While
prior experimental studies have found relationships between cognitive ability and faking on
personality measures (Pauls & Crost, 2005; Tett et al., 2012), these were both studies in which
participants were explicitly directed to engage in faking. As such, these findings are novel in that
they suggest that applicants with higher levels of cognitive ability may be more likely to engage
in response distortion relative to applicants with lower levels of cognitive ability, even when they
are not instructed to do so and regardless of the motivational factors measured in the current
study.
Prior research has suggested that individuals with high levels cognitive ability are adept
at identifying the individual differences that are being measured in a wide variety of selection
tools, including personality assessments, (Klehe et al., 2011; Melchers et al., 2009), and that this
ability accounts for much of the criterion-related validity of these measurements when predicting
job performance criteria (Jansen et al., 2013; Ingold et al., 2015 and König et al., 2007). It seems
like many participants in the current study treated the personality assessment that was ostensibly
administered in a selection situation much as they would treat an assessment center exercise or a
situational judgment test: they attempted to identify the criteria that were being measured and
respond in a way that they felt would be viewed favorably. Those with higher levels of cognitive
ability were either more effective at doing so, which would come as no surprise in light of prior
research in this area, or were more likely to perceive the personality assessment itself as a

24

It should be noted that Christiansen et al. (2005) found that forced-choice measures can still be effectively faked
by applicants with high levels of cognitive ability.
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performance-driven scenario.
Not only did participants’ scores on the Wonderlic PI-R demonstrate relationships with
response distortion on the traits of conscientiousness, emotional stability, and openness, but these
scores also demonstrated significant correlations with scores on the traits of emotional stability (r
= .25) and openness (r = .16) when these scales were administered in the “faking” condition25.
This echoes some prior research (Klehe et al., 2012) and provides further evidence that the
construct validity of personality assessments may compromised in selection settings due to
contamination by cognitive ability and related constructs. While this may be somewhat troubling
from a measurement standpoint, this contamination is unlikely to substantially impact the ability
of personality inventories to effectively predict job performance in typical-performance
situations (see Sackett, Zedeck, & Fogli, 1988) because cognitive ability has previously been
shown to be predictive of performance in typical-performance situations as well (Klehe &
Latham, 2008). However, the possibility that personality measures in applied selection settings
may be contaminated by cognitive ability raises some concerns regarding the potential for these
measures to demonstrate higher levels of adverse impact than conventional wisdom would
suggest (Ployhart & Holtz, 2008; Risavy & Hausdorf, 2011).
Integrity, as measured using the Honesty-Humility scale from the HEXACO PI-R, was
not directly related to faking on any one of the five personality scales. Furthermore, integrity
failed to moderate the vast majority of relationships between the situational judgments described
in Vroom’s (1964) theory and subsequent faking (the relationship between valence and faking on
the agreeableness scale being the sole exception). As such, it appears that applicants have few

25

Note that scores on the Wonderlic PI-R were not significantly correlated with scores on any of the IPIP Five
Factor Markers scales in the honest condition. However, some prior research has found relationships between
cognitive ability and Big Five personality traits when the personality measures were administered during nonselection situations (Rammstedt, Danner, & Martin, 2016).
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ethical reservations about engaging in faking on personality assessments when they are used for
selection purposes. While these findings were unexpected, one must remember that personality
inventories are generally viewed poorly by job applicants relative to other personnel selection
methods, such as interviews and work sample tests (Hausknecht, Day, & Thomas, 2004).
Job applicants likely have negative attitudes regarding personality inventories when they
are used in selection settings because they are perceived as being less job-related relative to
others measures, such as work simulations, interviews, and knowledge-based tests (Smither,
Reilly, Millsap, & Pearlman, 1993). Prior research has demonstrated that fairness perceptions
regarding a selection systems are largely influenced by the perceived job-relatedness of the
selection tools that are used (Hausknecht et al., 2004; Truxillo, Bauer, Paronto, & Campion,
2002; Vianen, Taris, Scholten, & Schinkel, 2004). As such, it is likely that the use of personality
inventories within selection contexts is seen by many job applicants as being unethical. If this is
indeed the case, it stands to reason that job applicants may not view faking on personality tests
within selection contexts as being an inherently unethical activity (contradicting to the assertions
of prior theorists, Griffith et al., 2006). This is a difficult problem to address. Prior research has
suggested that providing applicants with information about the processes used to develop a
selection tool and the relationship between scores on the tool and job performance may enhance
applicant perceptions of fairness (Truxillo et al., 2002). While this may in fact cause some job
applicants to view faking on personality measures as problematic, it is unlikely to dissuade
applicants with low levels of integrity from engaging in this practice.
The finding that integrity moderated the relationship between valence and response
distortion on the agreeableness scale, and only the agreeableness scale, is difficult to explain. It
may be possible that the impact of applicant integrity on faking varies depending on the
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perceived ethical characteristics of the items themselves. For example, items relating to
agreeableness may be viewed as reflecting ethical aspects of one’s character more so than items
relating to conscientiousness or other traits. Applicants may simply view response distortion on
items related to traits such as conscientiousness as putting one’s best foot forward, and may feel
encouraged to do so if they view the job to which they are applying as highly desirable.
However, items relating to agreeableness (e.g. “I am not interested in other people’s problems”)
may be perceived as having an ethical connotations, and as such would be less likely to be faked
by people high on integrity. Admittedly, this is pure speculation as there is little in the existing
literature to suggest the existence of such a phenomenon.
One should also note that scores on the integrity measure were positively correlated with
honest condition scores on the agreeableness measure. As such, this moderating effect of
integrity on the valence-agreeableness faking relationship may simply be due to a ceiling effect:
participants with high scores on the integrity measure also tended to have higher honest
condition scores on the agreeableness measure, and as such had less opportunity to engage in
faking.
Study Limitations
The use of a student sample represents one of the largest limitations of the current study.
While this study did indeed differ from the vast majority of laboratory-based experimental
studies on applicant faking in that I did not explicitly instruct applicants to engage in faking, it is
unlikely that the participants in my study were completely analogous to real-world job
applicants. For one, real-world job applicants voluntarily seek out and apply for specific
positions, whereas the participants in my study were compelled to ostensibly apply for a job in
exchange for course credit. In one case, having good scores on a personality test may be
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necessary to secure employment and remain financially solvent. In the other case, having good
scores on the personality test may merely enable the participant to attain a secondary benefit (i.e.,
receiving a job offer) from research participation, an activity in which they would otherwise still
engage. As such, it is unlikely that the applicants in my study experienced psychological pressure
to engage in response distortion that is fully analogous to that experienced by real-world job
applicants.
The relatively small sample size in this study limited the current study’s theoretical
scope. Given that my hypotheses posited a three-way interaction effect between valence,
instrumentality, and expectancy judgments, and that all of the individual impact of these three
judgments were all hypothesized to be moderated by both cognitive ability and integrity, it
would have been prudent to also examine potential four-way and five-way interactions between
these variables. Sadly, this was not possible due to the limited sample size in the current study.
The lack of a counterbalanced condition represents another limitation of the current study. All of
the participants in my study first completed a personality measure while they were purportedly in
a selection scenario before being debriefed and completing the same personality measure a
second time in an “honest” condition. As such, practice effects and/or participant fatigue may
have had an impact on scores in the honest condition. A prior study that used a similar
experimental paradigm (Peterson et al., 2009) was able to incorporate a counterbalanced
condition. However, the experimenters in that study were able to do so because they were able to
collect honest-condition scores from participants by having them complete a personality
inventory as part of a class project several weeks prior to participation in the experimental
study26. Sadly, this was not feasible in the current environment.

26

Peterson et al. (2009) were able to compel these same undergraduate classes to purportedly apply for a position
as part of their study.
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The use of the IPIP Big Five Factor Markers Inventory represents another potential issue.
While the scales contained within the IPIP Big Five Factor Markers Inventory appeared to
demonstrate favorable levels of internal consistency in the current study, these scales are still
publically available. As such, it is possible that some participants had viewed these scales before,
potentially as part of a class project or while participating in other research studies. If this was
the case for some participants, these participants likely didn’t believe the experimental
manipulation.
Conclusion and Agenda for Future Research
This study sought to apply expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964) in order to gain a better
understanding of the factors impacting applicants’ motivation to engage in deliberate faking on
self-report personality inventories that are administered as part of the selection process. Results
of the study suggest that out of the factors outlines in Vroom’s (1964) theory, valence judgments
and expectancy judgments tend to play the largest role in impacting applicant faking. That is, job
applicants who perceive the job in question as being more desirable, and those who are confident
in their ability to successfully engage fake their answers on a personality inventory, tend to
engage in greater levels of faking. The three way interaction between valence, instrumentality,
and expectancy judgments that Vroom described in his famous 1964 book was not positively
related to faking on any one of the personality scales used in this study. As such, while several
factors that Vroom described were shown to impact faking behavior in this study, his theory
ultimately did not account for faking behavior in the manner in which he had intended.
Results of the current study also show a direct association between cognitive ability and
faking on three different personality traits. This suggests that many applicants may treat
personality inventories as they would many other selection tools: as an obstacle to be overcome
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in order to secure a job offer. Applicants appear to have little qualms about doing so, given that
scores on an integrity measure showed no relationship with faking on subsequent personality
measures and for the most part failed to nullify the effects that valence and expectancy
judgments had on faking.
After reflecting on the results of this study, one may find themselves tempted to conclude
that faking on self-report personality inventories simply isn’t an issue, given that those most
likely to engage in faking tend to also have high levels of cognitive ability and perceive the job
to which they are applying as highly desirable. After all, who in their right mind wouldn’t want
to select highly intelligent applicants who really want the job? The issue is that this phenomenon
ultimately results in situations in which positions are filled by people with personalities that are
ill-suited for the particular role. While these individuals are able to engage in successful response
distortion on personality tests (and successful impression management during interviews and
other steps of the selection process), they will still be a poor match to the demands of the
position. These people will likely spend much of their working life actively engaging in
impression management, forcing them to divert cognitive energy away from the task-related
aspects of their job. This not only results in lower performance relative to hires who did not
engage in faking on a personality measure (Donovan, Dwight, & Schneider, 2014), but it may
also result in higher levels of burnout (Tong, Wang, & Peng, 2015) and voluntary turnover
(Arthur, Bell, Villado, & Doverspike, 2006). Ultimately, by ignoring this issue we not only do a
disservice to ourselves and organizations making hiring decisions, but also to the supposed
beneficiaries of applicant faking.
Unfortunately, the results of this study provide little information regarding specific
interventions that can be used to reduce the prevalence and magnitude of applicant faking. While
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valence judgments are associated with increased faking, it seems as if little can be done to
effectively reduce faking via reducing job valence. However, practitioners should consider the
possibility that macroeconomic factors (i.e., unemployment rates) may impact the extent to
which any available job is perceived as desirable to applicants – potentially leading to a greater
prevalence of faking on personality measures – and act accordingly.
Over the past several decades, globalization and rapid technological advances have
decimated the working class in developed economies around the world, leaving many of these
people desperate for work. It is completely understandable people in the “new economy” would
do almost anything to attain steady employment. I’ve made an effort to speak with job-seeking
family members and acquaintances over the past several months in order to see if I can learn
more about how the selection systems for which we are fierce advocates are perceived by the
average job applicant. It seems as if practicing I/O psychologists who work in the selection space
are oftentimes perceived by the general public27 to be dispassionate and detached from the
ultimate impact of the decisions that we make. After all, getting a job can radically change the
course of somebody’s life, and as far as they are concerned we are making these decisions in a
manner that seems entirely arbitrary. Many applicants simply do not view “picking the right
answers” on personality inventories as an ethical issue. Many of them in fact view selection
practitioners as being in the wrong for, in their eyes, placing additional barriers between them
and a much-needed paycheck.
We must never forget that the decisions we make have the potential to alter the lives of
many people. Perhaps transparency and mutual respect is the best way to discourage applicants
from attempting to engage in faking. Perhaps by informing applicants about the negative impact

27

Or at the very least, the very small sliver of the general public who is aware of our work.
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that being dishonest on personality assessments in selection settings may ultimately have on
them. That is, that by being hired for a job for which they are dispositionally unsuited they will
find themselves burned out, unhappy, and paying the myriad other costs that come with devoting
much of one’s waking hours to work that is unsatisfying.
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APPENDIX A: MATERIALS FROM STUDY 1
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A.1: TEXT GIVEN PRIOR TO ADMINISTRATION OF EXPECTANCY ITEMS
As you may know, personality tests are sometimes used as part of the hiring process. These
personality tests oftentimes ask people to agree or disagree with statements such as the following:












I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

am afraid of many things.
avoid imposing my will on others.
want every detail taken care of.
see myself as a good leader.
seldom notice the emotional aspects of paintings and pictures.
formulate ideas clearly.
am not a very enthusiastic person.
postpone decisions.
love a good fight.
keep my emotions under control.

How do you feel about tests that use questions like this?

A.2: JOB POSTING SHOWN PRIOR TO ADMINISTRATION OF VALENCE ITEMS
Please read the following job description.
OPENING: Technical Account Manager
Summit Healthcare Technologies is searching for a Technical Account Manager for our Mt.Dora, FL
location. Primary duties for this position center include maintaining existing relationships between
Summit Healthcare Technologies and our client healthcare providers in the central Florida region in
addition to prospecting for potential new clients in the region. It will also be critical for technical
account managers to be knowledgeable regarding developments within healthcare technology sector
in order to deliver the best possible solutions to client providers.
REQUIREMENTS:
A bachelor's degree, preferably in an area such as Biology, Psychology, or Business.
Willingness to travel regionally on a routine basis.
Proficient working knowledge of the Microsoft Office suite, including Excel, Word, and Powerpoint.
Qualified applicants will be comfortable engaging people in professional settings, will be able to get
along with others, will be detail-oriented, will remain calm under pressure, and will be open to a wide
variety of experiences and duties.
COMPENSATION:

$50,000 in addition to merit-based bonuses.

Summit Healthcare Technologies offers a competitive benefits package including health and dental
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insurance in addition to 401K matching.
How do you feel about this job posting?

A.3: TEXT GIVEN PRIOR TO ADMINISTRATION OF INSTRUMENTALITY ITEMS
Imagine that you have applied for a job as a Technical Account Manager (the job in the description
shown above). As part of the application process, you have to complete a personality test that has
questions like:
I don't mind being the center of attention.
I am not interested in other people's problems.
I find it difficult to get down to work.
I am not easily bothered by things.
I can handle a lot of information.
In addition to the personality test, you also participate in an in-person interview with somebody from
the company. The interview is about 45 minutes long and focuses on your past experience and your
qualifications for the job.
How would you feel after taking the personality test and completing the in-person
interview?

A.4: FACTOR LOADINGS FOR EXPLORATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS OF DRAFT VALENCE,
INSTRUMENTALITY, AND EXPECTANCY ITEMS WITH VARIMAX ROTATION
Factor
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Item Text

1

2

3

4

I would like having this job.

.944

I would like to get this job.

.935

I would enjoy this position.

.928

I would like this job.

.916

I would enjoy having this job.

.909

This job is appealing to me.

.907

I want to be hired for this job.

.893

This job suits my needs.

.882

This job is a good fit for me.

.879

This job is appealing relative to the other options I have available.

.871

This job would make me happy.

.858

I would be satisfied with this job.

.817

Having this job would bring me personal satisfaction.

.811

This is a good job.

.579

.527

This seems like a good job.

.574

.574

I can figure out which answers will give me the best score on the personality test.

.833

I can figure out the answers that people are looking for when I take a personality test.

.831

I can get a good score on the personality test if I try to pick the "best" answers.

.816

I can easily pick the "right" answers when taking a personality test.

.806

Figuring out the "best" answers on a personality test is easy.

.795

Faking your answers on a personality test isn’t difficult.

.789

I can tell people what they want to hear when taking the personality test.

.783
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.206

Factor
Item Text

1

2

I can make myself look good by faking my answers.

.762

I can fake my answers on the personality test if I try.

.754

I can be deceptive when taking a personality test.

.743

3

4

Doing well on the personality test is critical if you want to get hired.

.876

Having a good score on the personality test is critical if you want to be hired.

.876

You must do well on the personality test in order to be hired.

.805

Scores on the personality test are a big part of the hiring decision.

.776

Being hired largely depends on scores on the personality test.

.772

Whether or not you get hired depends on your scores on the personality test.

.754

If you do well on the personality test, you will be hired.

.689

You will be hired if you have a good score on the personality test.

.654

.230

Having a good score on the personality test is important if you want to get interviewed
or hired.
The personality test is used to determine who gets hired.

.601

.270

The personality test is used to see if candidates are a good fit for the job.

.368

Note: Italicized items were retained in the final scales. Factor loadings below .20 are not displayed.
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.595
.283

APPENDIX B: MATERIALS FROM PRIMARY STUDY
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B.1: HEXACO PI-R HONESTY-HUMILITY MEASURE
(All items on this scale are answered on a five point Likert scale, with anchors of “strongly disagree” and
“strongly agree”)
If I want something from a person I dislike, I will act very nicely toward that person in order to get it.
I wouldn't use flattery to get a raise or promotion at work, even if I thought it would succeed.
If I want something from someone, I will laugh at that person's worst jokes.
I wouldn't pretend to like someone just to get that person to do favors for me.
If I knew that I could never get caught, I would be willing to steal a million dollars.
I would be tempted to buy stolen property if I were financially tight.
I would never accept a bribe, even if it were very large.
I’d be tempted to use counterfeit money, if I were sure I could get away with it.
Having a lot of money is not especially important to me.
I would like to live in a very expensive, high-class neighborhood.
I would like to be seen driving around in a very expensive car.
I would get a lot of pleasure from owning expensive luxury goods.
I am an ordinary person who is no better than others.
I wouldn’t want people to treat me as though I were superior to them.
I think that I am entitled to more respect than the average person is.
I want people to know that I am an important person of high status.

B.2: TEXT SHOWN TO PARTICIPANTS BEFORE THEY FOLLOWED THE LINK TO THE
WONDERLIC WEBSITE
Next we are going to have you take a brief test of cognitive ability. This test is hosted on another
website and will be linked to the data hosted on the UCF website via a unique Participant Identification
Number that you will create now.
Your Participant Identification Number can be any combination of alphanumeric characters that you
want to use.
Please enter your Participant Identification Number below.
Please write down your Participant Identification Number on a sheet on scratch paper because you
will have to enter it several more times throughout the study.
At the bottom of this page you will find the link to the Wonderlic Online testing website where you will
take a test of cognitive ability. Upon following the link below, you will be asked to input your Participant
Identification Number. Please input the same Participant Identification Number that you did on the
precious page. The test should take approximately 20-30 minutes to complete. Following the test, you
will return to this page where you can continue with the remaining sections of the study.
Do not close this tab.
Do not move onto the next page until you have completed the test on the Wonderlic Online testing
website.
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Here is the link to the Wonderlic Online testing website.
https://rnd-testing.wonderliconline.com/WebPages/Links.aspx?lid=UCF_Mihm
After you have finished completing the Wonderlic test, please continue to the next page.

B.3: TEXT TO INTRODUCE EXPECTANCY MEASURES FOR INTEGRITY TESTS:
As you may know, integrity tests are sometimes used as part of the hiring process. These tests
oftentimes ask people to agree or disagree with statements such as the following:
I lie to get myself out of trouble.
I believe that honesty is the basis for trust.
I like to exaggerate my troubles.
How do you feel about tests that use questions like this?
(All items on this scale are answered on a five point Likert scale, with anchors of “strongly disagree” and
“strongly agree”)
1. I can figure out which answers will give me the best score on the integrity test.
2. I can figure out the answers that people are looking for when I take the integrity test.
3. I can get a good score on the integrity test if I try to pick the “best” answers.
4. Faking your answers on integrity tests isn’t difficult.

B.4: TEXT TO INTRODUCE EXPECTANCY MEASURES FOR PERSONALITY TESTS:
As you may know, personality tests are sometimes used as part of the hiring process. These personality
tests oftentimes ask people to agree or disagree with statements such as the following:
I am afraid of many things.
I avoid imposing my will on others.
I want every detail taken care of.
I see myself as a good leader.
I seldom notice the emotional aspects of paintings and pictures.
I formulate ideas clearly.
I am not a very enthusiastic person.
I postpone decisions.
I love a good fight.
I keep my emotions under control.
How do you feel about tests that use questions like this?
(All items on this scale are answered on a five point Likert scale, with anchors of “strongly disagree” and
“strongly agree”)
1. I can figure out which answers will give me the best score on the personality test.
2. I can figure out the answers that people are looking for when I take the personality test.
3. I can get a good score on the personality test if I try to pick the “best” answers.
4. Faking your answers on personality tests isn’t difficult.
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B.5: JOB POSTING
Please read the following job description:
Opening: Technical Account Manager
Summit Healthcare Technologies is searching for a Technical Account Manager for our Mt.Dora, FL
location. Primary duties for this position center include:
Maintaining existing relationships between Summit Healthcare Technologies and our client healthcare
providers in the central Florida region.
Prospecting for potential new clients in the region.
Staying current regarding developments within healthcare technology sector in order to deliver the best
possible solutions to client providers.
Handling multiple priorities in a fast-paced environment while delivering high quality customer service.
REQUIREMENTS
A bachelor's degree, preferably in an area such as Biology, Psychology, or Business.
Willingness to travel regionally on a routine basis.
Proficient working knowledge of the Microsoft Office suite, including Excel, Word, and Powerpoint.
Qualified applicants will be comfortable engaging people in professional settings, will be able to get
along with others, will be detail-oriented, will remain calm under pressure, and will be open to a wide
variety of experiences and duties.
COMPENSATION
$50,000-$59,999 annually in addition to merit-based bonuses.
Summit Healthcare Technologies offers a competitive benefits package including health and dental
insurance in addition to 401K matching.

B.5: TEXT TO INTRODUCE VALENCE MEASURE
How do you feel about this job?
(All items on this scale are answered on a five point Likert scale, with anchors of “strongly disagree” and
“strongly agree”)
1. I would like having this job.
2. This job is appealing to me.
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3. I want to be hired for this job.
4. This job suits my needs.
5. This job is appealing relative to other options that I have available.
6. This job is a good fit for me.

B.6: TEXT TO INTRODUCE EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATION
Several graduate students within the industrial/organizational psychology have begun working on a
research project with a Fortune 500 company that is expanding into the Central Florida area. The
purpose of this study is to develop a hiring system, which will include integrity, intelligence, and
personality tests. These tests are going to be used by the company as part of the hiring process for the
technical account manager position (the job that you saw on the last page), which is usually a job filled
by recent college graduates who come from a wide variety of academic backgrounds.
It’s important to us that these tests are not only be a good predictor of job performance, but is also
perceived favorably by applicants, which is why we have been asking you questions about these tests.
On the next page, you will be taking the current version of a personality test that is currently under
development. While this test is still in development, you will be contacted in the future to interview for
a technical account manager position if you consent to be contacted and your personality profile is
compatible with the demands of the job. Remember, while a candidate’s personality profile matters, it is
just one of many things that are considered during the hiring process.
Please note that only your answers to the personality test on the next page and your resume (if you
choose to include it) will be sent to the company, all of your responses to the other questions will only
be viewed by researchers here at UCF. Before you take the personality test, please answer the following
questions.
□

I consent to be contacted in the future regarding an interview.

□

I do not consent to be contacted in the future regarding an interview.

B.7: TEXT TO INTRODUCE INSTRUMENTALITY MEASURES
Before you take the personality test, please answer the following questions.
(All items on this scale are answered on a five point Likert scale, with anchors of “strongly disagree” and
“strongly agree”)
Having a good score on the personality test is critical if you want to be hired.
Having a good score on the integrity test is critical if you want to be hired.
Having a good score on the personality test is critical if you want to be hired.
Having a good score on the intelligence test is critical if you want to be hired.
Having a good score on the integrity test is critical if you want to be hired.
Having a good score on the interview is critical if you want to be hired.
Whether or not you get hired depends on your scores on the personality test.
Whether or not you get hired depends on your scores on the integrity test.
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Whether or not you get hired depends on your scores on the intelligence test.
Whether or not you get hired depends on your scores on the interview.
Doing well on the personality test is necessary if you want to get hired.
Doing well on the integrity test is necessary if you want to get hired.
Doing well on the intelligence test is necessary if you want to get hired.
Doing well on the interview is necessary if you want to get hired.
Being hired largely depends on scores on the personality test.
Being hired largely depends on scores on the integrity test.
Being hired largely depends on scores on the intelligence test.
Being hired largely depends on scores on the interview.
You must do well on the personality test in order to be hired.
You must do well on the integrity test in order to be hired.
You must do well on the intelligence test in order to be hired.
You must do well on the interview in order to be hired.
Scores on the personality test are a big part of the hiring decision.
Scores on the integrity test are a big part of the hiring decision.
Scores on the intelligence test are a big part of the hiring decision.
Scores on the interview are a big part of the hiring decision.

B.8: TEXT TO INTRODUCE PERSONALITY MEASURE
If you would like to have your resume sent to the company that is funding this study along with your
scores on the personality test, please attach it below.
You will now be taking the personality test that is currently being developed by researchers here at UCF.
Please carefully read and respond to each statement.
How accurately does each one of the following statements describe you?

B.9: IPIP BIG FIVE FACTOR MARKERS INVENTORY
Factor 1: Extraversion
Positively Keyed
I am the life of the party.
I feel comfortable around people.
I start conversations.
I talk to a lot of different people at parties.
I don't mind being the center of attention.
I make friends easily.
I take charge.
I know how to captivate people.
I feel at ease with people.
I am skilled in handling social situations.
Negatively Keyed
I don't talk a lot.
I keep in the background.
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I have little to say.
I don't like to draw attention to myself.
I am quiet around strangers.
I find it difficult to approach others.
I often feel uncomfortable around others.
I bottle up my feelings.
I am a very private person.
I wait for others to lead the way.
Factor 2: Agreeableness
Positively Keyed
I am interested in people.
I sympathize with others' feelings.
I have a soft heart.
I take time out for others.
I feel others' emotions.
I make people feel at ease.
I inquire about others' well-being.
I know how to comfort others.
I love children.
I am on good terms with nearly everyone.
I have a good word for everyone.
I show my gratitude.
I think of others first.
I love to help others.
Negatively Keyed
I insult people.
I am not interested in other people's problems.
I feel little concern for others.
I am not really interested in others.
I am hard to get to know.
I am indifferent to the feelings of others.
Factor 3: Conscientiousness
Positively Keyed
I am always prepared.
I pay attention to details.
I get chores done right away.
I like order.
I follow a schedule.
I am exacting in my work.
I do things according to a plan.
I continue until everything is perfect.
I make plans and stick to them.
I love order and regularity.
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I like to tidy up.
Negatively Keyed
I leave my belongings around.
I make a mess of things.
I often forget to put things back in their proper place.
I shirk my duties.
I neglect my duties.
I waste my time.
I do things in a half-way manner.
I find it difficult to get down to work.
I leave a mess in my room.
Factor 4: Emotional Stability
Positively Keyed
I am relaxed most of the time.
I seldom feel blue.
I am not easily bothered by things.
I rarely get irritated.
I seldom get mad.
Negatively Keyed
I get stressed out easily.
I worry about things.
I am easily disturbed.
I get upset easily.
I change my mood a lot.
I have frequent mood swings.
I get irritated easily.
I often feel blue.
I get angry easily.
I panic easily.
I feel threatened easily.
I get overwhelmed by emotions.
I take offense easily.
I get caught up in my problems.
I grumble about things.
Factor 5: Intellect/Openness to Experience
Positively Keyed
I have a rich vocabulary.
I have a vivid imagination.
I have excellent ideas.
I am quick to understand things.
I use difficult words.
I spend time reflecting on things.
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I am full of ideas.
I carry the conversation to a higher level.
I catch on to things quickly.
I can handle a lot of information.
I love to think up new ways of doing things.
I love to read challenging material.
I am good at many things.
Negatively Keyed
I have difficulty understanding abstract ideas.
I am not interested in abstract ideas.
I do not have a good imagination.
I try to avoid complex people.
I have difficulty imagining things.
I avoid difficult reading material.
I will not probe deeply into a subject

B.10: TEXT TO REVEAL DECEPTION.
The purpose of this study is to look at how people respond to questions on personality tests in a socially
desirable way (i.e., “faking”) when these personality tests are used as part of the hiring process.
Specifically, we wanted to examine how a person’s perception of the situation impacts faking. In order
to create social pressure that might cause people to fake their answers on the tests that we
administered earlier, we used deception. The principal investigator of this study is not working with a
company in order to develop a personality inventory, and your scores will not be sent to any company
for review. That was a fabrication used in order to create social pressure within the experimental
setting. If you feel upset, distressed, or uncomfortable, please do not hesitate to contact David Mihm,
the study’s principal investigator, (dmihmucf@knights.ucf.edu) to voice your concerns.
After this page, you will be taking the personality test a second time, this time without any social
pressure to inflate your score. Note that I am not accusing you of inflating your scores or lying on the
personality test that you took earlier, because it is very possible that you did not do this.
Please relax and simply respond to the questions on the personality test on the next page in the way
that feels most natural to you.
Thank you for taking the time to participate in my study.
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